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Abstract
This thesis consists of three essays on household finance and banking.
The first chapter examines the role of brokers in the UK mortgage market. Mort-
gage brokers operate as intermediaries between households and lenders, acting as
expert advisors for consumers and as distributors for mortgage providers. Using
loan-level data from the universe of UK mortgage originations, I study the interac-
tions between households, brokers and lenders. I find that, in this market, brokers
often charge fees to households, while at the same time receiving commission pay-
ments from lenders for the sale of their products. The data suggest that these
commissions can distort brokers’ advice, potentially generating an agency problem
between households and brokers. However, I also find evidence that brokers can
benefit consumers by increasing upstream competition. By facilitating the entry
of new, lower-cost mortgage providers, brokers increase competition among lenders,
which can result in lower interest rates for households. It is important to understand
both the positive and negative effects of having brokers when considering regulation
in this market.
The second chapter empirically analyzes the effects on welfare and market struc-
ture of regulations restricting broker compensation in the UK mortgage market.
To study the net effect of these regulations in equilibrium, I estimate a structural
model that features households’ demand for mortgage products and broker services,
lenders’ optimal pricing decisions, and broker-lender bilateral bargaining over com-
mission rates. I use the estimates to evaluate the impact of policies restricting
brokers’ commission payments. I find that a ban on commissions leads to a 25% de-
crease in consumer welfare, whereas a cap equal to the median commission increases
consumer surplus by 10%. The intuition behind this finding is that by introducing
a more restrictive cap, we are decreasing broker market power at the expense of
increasing lender market power. A tighter cap will increase consumer surplus by
aligning the incentives of brokers and households, but it will also decrease consumer
surplus by reducing competition among lenders. In this chapter, I quantify both
opposing forces to capture the net effect of different policies.
The third chapter, co-authored with Nikos Artavanis, Daniel Paravisini, Amit
Seru and Margarita Tsoutsoura, develops a new approach to isolate and quantify the
extent to which deposit withdrawals are due to liquidity, exposure to policy risk, or
expectations about how other depositors will behave. We use high frequency micro-
data on insured time-deposits from a large Greek bank over a long time period
that spans quiet periods as well as events with large policy uncertainty. We use
variation induced by maturity expiration of time deposits around the large policy
uncertainty events to filter deposit withdrawals due to direct exposure to policy risk
from those due to expectations about behavior of other depositors. In response to a
policy uncertainty shock that doubled the short-run CDS price of Greek sovereign
bonds, the early deposit withdrawal probability quadrupled. About two-thirds of
this increase is driven by direct exposure to policy risk with the remainder due to
changes in expectations of behavior of other depositors. We quantify these effects in
terms of forgone interest rates and changes in short-run CDS prices. Our estimates
imply effects that compare well with anecdotes from other recent prominent episodes
of depositor withdrawals.
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Chapter 1
The Role of Brokers in the UK
Mortgage Market
1.1 Introduction
When originating a mortgage, households can directly contact lenders via their
branch network and online platforms. Alternatively, households can hire certified
experts, in the form of mortgage brokers, to help them decide which options best
fit their needs and assist them with the application process. In the UK, almost
50% of households consult with mortgage brokers when deciding on their mort-
gages.1 To compensate brokers for their services, households often pay a−sometimes
significant− fee. However, these downstream charges are not the only source of rev-
enue for brokers in this market. They also receive commission payments from lenders
whenever they originate one of their mortgages. This form of compensation may
1Brokers also play a key role in other developed countries. In the US, mortgage brokers
originated over 44% of residential mortgages before the crisis (National Association of Mortgage
Brokers, http://www.namb.org) and about 33% after the crisis (Alexandrov and Koulayev, 2018).
Similarly 53% of Australians rely on mortgage brokers (Mortgage and Finance Association of
Australia’s (MFAA), and according to the Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC)
55% of first-time buyers in Canada use a broker when originating their mortgage.
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influence brokers’ advice, causing them to steer consumers towards high-commission
mortgages. If these mortgages are also more expensive or worse in other dimensions
that consumers may value, commissions can potentially generate an agency problem
between brokers and households and reduce consumer welfare in this market.
Using a novel loan-level dataset for all mortgage originations in the UK, I analyze
the role of brokers in this market and the key trade-offs consumers may face given
incentives and market structure. I find evidence suggesting that broker sales react
to changes in lenders’ financial incentives. After controlling for a rich set of fixed
effects, I find that products with a 13% (£100) higher commission for a broker have,
on average, a 2% higher share in the broker’s sales portfolio. Therefore, despite
demand-side incentives that might discipline brokers to act in the best interest of
households (e.g., repeated sales and reputation concerns), brokers seem responsive
to supply-side monetary incentives.
The data also shows that brokers allow small, challenger banks to introduce
their products at a lower cost (e.g., less need for an extensive branch network). In
exchange, challenger banks pay, on average, higher commissions to brokers. They
also offer the cheapest deals for many products in the market. After accounting for
observable characteristics, households originating their mortgage through a broker
are 7 percentage points more likely to choose a product from these new lenders. In an
industry that is very concentrated upstream, brokers seem to improve competition by
making households aware of better products that would otherwise not be discovered
given challenger banks’ limited advertisement and lack of extensive branch networks.
I also find that, despite the rise of price comparison websites and online sales,
nearby bank branches still matter for household choices. The number of branches in
a given county is strongly correlated with lenders’ share of non-intermediated sales,
suggesting borrowers using lenders’ in-house distribution channels value proximity
of the nearest branch. Moreover, in counties where lenders have a low branch
16
density, they tend to pay higher commissions to brokers in order to increase their
market share via intermediated sales. Brokers offer lenders a way to introduce
their products in areas where setting up a branch is costly and consumer take-
up of online distribution channels remains low. However, in areas where lenders
already have a high branch density, brokers can steal business from lenders’ in-
house distribution channels. These results suggest brokers and bank branches are
substitutes. Because households can bypass the intermediary and go directly to
lenders, the relationship between brokers and lenders in this market is both vertical
(brokers provide an alternative distribution channel for lenders) and horizontal
(brokers compete downstream with lenders’ in-house distribution channels).
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 describes the data and
the institutional setting. I present some stylized facts particular to the UK mortgage
market. Section 1.3 shows motivating empirical evidence on potential trade-offs and
conflicts of interests in the data. In Section 1.4, I conclude by discussing the need
for a model to study the trade-offs in this market and how the different roles brokers
play can be affected by regulation.
1.2 Institutional Setting and Data
1.2.1 The UK Mortgage Market
The UK mortgage market has several institutional features that differentiate it from
mortgage markets in the US, Canada, and Continental Europe. For example, the
UK has no long-term fixed-rate mortgages. Most products feature a relatively low
(usually fixed) interest rate for an initial period of usually two, three, or five years
followed by a (usually floating) reset rate that is significantly higher. Reset rates
last until the end of the mortgage term, unless borrowers decide to refinance. Addi-
tionally, most mortgage contracts include early repayment charges, which typically
17
account for 5% or 10% of the outstanding loan and are in place until the end of the
initial fixed period. Given the significant size of these charges and the jump in the
reset rate, most borrowers refinance around the time when the initial duration ends,
making remortgaging a relatively frequent event in this market (see, e.g., Cloyne
et al., 2017).
Another important aspect of the UK mortgage market is individual-based pric-
ing or negotiation between the lender and the borrower is limited. All borrowers
purchasing the same mortgage product pay close to the advertised rate. Lenders’
pricing of default risk in this market seems to be driven by loan-to-value ratios (see,
e.g., Best et al., 2018), whereas the pricing of refinancing risk is embedded in the
duration of the initial fixed period (see, e.g., Benetton, 2018). Therefore, products
with the same maximum loan-to-value and initial fixed period should have very
similar interest rates for a given lender. I test this assertion by regressing loan-
level interest rates on an extensive set of dummy variables. Figure 1-1 reports the
adjusted R-squared that results from such regressions. I consider a product to be
a triplet of the maximum loan-to-value, initial period, and lender, and I find that
product-month fixed effects and the corresponding lender fees account for more than
90% of the variation in mortgage rates. The adjusted R-squared does not increase
once I control for borrower characteristics (age, income, credit score, employment
status) and location of the property. Moreover, the residual variation cannot be
explained after including a dummy for the mortgage being originated through a
broker.
In terms of market structure, the UK mortgage market is very concentrated
upstream. The six largest lenders in the market account for more than 75% of mort-
gage originations. Panel A in Figure 1-2 shows the consolidation process that these
lenders, the so-called “Big Six,” have experienced over the last decades. Through
a series of mergers and acquisitions, they have been able to achieve significant
18
Figure 1-1: Explained variation in mortgage pricing
Note: the chart reports the adjusted R2 of regressions of household level interest rates and fees
on a set of dummy variables. First row includes only dummies for the product (interaction of
lender, maximum loan-to-value band and initial fixed period). Second row adds fixed effects for
each month. Third row adds dummies for lender fees (other price). Fourth row includes dummies
for the location of the house and borrower characteristics (income, age, credit score). Finally, fifth
row adds a dummy accounting for whether the mortgage was originated by a broker or directly
through the lender’s in-house distribution channels.
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market power at a national level. However, the last several years have also seen
significant entry in the market from the so-called “Challenger Banks.” Panel B in
Figure 1-2 presents the timeline for the main entrants in the mortgage market.
Many of these entrants have a very limited branch network and promote their
products mostly through on-line distribution channels and intermediaries. This
strategy has proven successful partly because of the strong presence of mortgage
brokers in the UK market. In 2017, more than 70% of first-time-buyers and 60%
of home-movers originated their mortgage through an intermediary. Brokers also
have a significant market share in the remortgaging market, especially for those
borrowers who refinance with a different lender. Although many individual brokers
are present in the form of one-person firms, the broker market is dominated by the
largest 20 broker companies. These brokerage firms account for more than 60% of
all new originations and have direct communication with lenders. I will discuss the
relationship between lenders and broker companies in more detail when describing
the data in the next subsection.
1.2.2 Data
My main dataset is the Product Sales Database (hereafter, PSD), which is a com-
prehensive regulatory dataset containing the universe of residential mortgage orig-
inations in the UK. These data are collected quarterly by the Financial Conduct
Authority (FCA) and are only available to restricted members of staff and associated
researchers at the FCA and the Bank of England. For the purposes of this paper,
I focus on the year 2015 and the first half of 2016. During this period, I observe
for each mortgage origination details on the loan (interest rate, loan amount, initial
fixed period, lender, fees), the borrower (income, age, credit score), and the property
(value, location). I also have information on the distribution channel, that is,
whether a broker intermediates the sale and, if so, the identity of the brokerage.
20
Figure 1-2: Consolidation and Entry in the UK Mortgage Market
PANEL A: Consolidation in the UK banking sector over the last 50 years
PANEL B: Entry in the UK banking sector over the last 10 years (not exhaustive)
Notes: Panels A shows mergers and acquisitions for the Big Six lenders in the UK. Panel B
presents a non-exhaustive timeline of recent entrants in the UK mortgage market. Graphs
use data adapted from PwC Report ”Who are you calling a challenger?”, Bankers Magazine,
and Quarterly Bulletin, Q4, Bank of England, 2010, plus additional dates from lenders’ own
websites.
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Table 1.1 summarizes the data. I observe more than 2 million contracts of which
almost 90% are mortgages with initial fixed periods of two, three, and five years.
Given the importance of refinancing in this market, the finding that more than
50% of borrowers in my sample are either external or internal remortgagors is not
surprising. The average interest rate is 2.57 percentage points, and lenders charge
on average an origination fee of £467. The average loan is almost £160,000 with
a loan-to-value of 60%, a loan-to-income of 3.1, and an average maturity of 25
years. Borrowers are, on average, 38 years old, have an annual income of £62,000.
Borrowers are richer and have higher credit scores than the average UK resident.
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics (All Borrowers).
N Mean SD Min Max
Panel A: Loan Characteristics
Interest Rate (%) 2,236,025 2.57 0.79 1.26 6.2
Lender Fee (£) 2,236,025 467 631 0 2405
Loan Value (£1000) 2,236,025 159 129 49 903
Loan-to-Value (%) 2,236,025 60 23 15 98
Maturity (Years) 2,236,025 25 8 2 45
Initial Period (Years) 2,236,025 3.22 2.4 1 10
Panel B: Borrower Characteristics
First-Time-Buyers 2,236,025 0.19 0.39 0 1
Home-Movers 2,236,025 0.23 0.42 0 1
Internal Remortgagors 2,236,025 0.22 0.41 0 1
External Remortgagors 2,236,025 0.36 0.48 0 1
Gross Income (£1000) 1,506,724 62.13 48.2 10 523
Age (Years) 1,506,724 38 9.6 18 85
Loan-to-Income 1,506,724 3.12 1.2 1.3 5.2
Credit Score 984,471 482 66.3 250 765
22
I complement the PSD data with novel information on broker companies that
is also collected by the FCA. For each mortgage origination in the PSD, I observe
commission payments (made by lenders to brokers for a given sale), broker fees (paid
by borrowers), and supplementary details on contract agreements between lenders
and brokers. Table 1.2 summarizes the data. Panel A compares the fraction of
intermediated sales and the average per-sale broker remuneration across borrower
types. More than 70% of first-time-buyers originate their mortgage through a
brokerage. Intermediation is also the most popular distribution channel in the
home-movers and external remortgagors markets, with shares above 60%. Only 11%
of internal remortgagors (those refinancing with the same lender) hired a broker
when renewing their mortgage. On average, a broker will receive over £800 per
mortgage, with most of the revenue coming from lenders’ commissions and only a
small fraction (if any at all) from broker fees. Figure A-1 plots the distribution of
broker fees, revealing that most broker companies charge borrowers zero fees for their
services. On the other hand, commissions from lenders are quite generous. Figure
A-2 shows the distribution of commission rates across borrower types. No within-
lender-broker variation exists for a given period, implying commissions are the same
for all products within each lender-broker pair. However, significant heterogeneity
exists across brokers and across time, with commission rates ranging between 0.3%
and 0.8% of the loan.
Panels B and C of Table 1.2 report the average number of agreements between
brokers and lenders and the fraction that were formed or broken during my sample
period. The average lender deals with 13 broker companies, whereas the average
brokerage sells products from 18 lenders. However, there is heterogeneity both across
brokers and across lenders. For example, one lender has no dealings with brokers,
whereas another lender has agreements with all brokers. Likewise, some broker
companies have very few lenders in their network, whereas others include almost
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics for Intermediated Sales and Broker-Lender
Agreements.
PANEL A: Intermediated sales and broker payments.
All
Borrowers
First-Time
Buyers
Home
Movers
Internal
Remortgagors
External
Remortgagors
Intermediated 46% 72% 64% 11% 63%
Commission (£) 723 661 845 708 543
Commission Rate (% loan) 0.41 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.37
Broker Fee (£) 141 167 164 3 129
N 2,236,025 426,958 510,833 797,430 500,804
Panel B: Agreements between largest lenders and broker companies.
Mean SD Min Max
Number of Brokers per Lender 13 7 0 23
Number of Lenders per Broker 8 3 3 14
Panel C: Changes in agreements between 2015Q1-2016Q2.
Lender-Broker Links Broken 11%
Lender-Broker Links Formed 18%
Note: Panel A summarizes the percentage of borrowers who originate their mortgage through a
broker and the average per-sale commissions and fees brokers receive by lenders and households,
respectively. Panels B and C report all agreements between the largest 16 lenders and 23 broker
companies, which account for 87% of the first-time-buyers market. These constitute the set of
lenders and brokers that I will use later when estimating the model.
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every lender. There is variation in broker-lender networks across time. Throughout
my sample period, there are 18% new agreements and 11% of links are broken.
Finally, I collect quarterly postcode-level data on all bank branches in the UK
from Experian’s Goad and Shop*Point datasets. This panel allows me to identify
branch openings and closures for all lenders in my sample. Figure 1-3 plots time-
series variation in the number of branches for the largest lenders. Aggregate total
branches fall by almost 17% during my sample period. Despite the general downward
trend, branch openings and closures are very heterogeneous across lenders and
geographical areas (see Figure A-3). For example, London and other large urban
Figure 1-3: Total Branches for largest lenders
Note: Data obtained from Experian Shop*Point and Goad datasets. Total branches account for
both openings and closures during the sample period.
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conurbations experience large openings for some lenders, whereas some rural areas
are essentially bank-branch deserts.
Overall, the combination of these three sources of data provides me with a very
rich, loan-level dataset that is ideal for analyzing the effects of broker remuneration
on the market. This paper is the first to exploit these combined datasets and the
first one to address the role of brokers in this market.
1.3 Motivating Evidence
In this section, I document in more detail evidence in favor of the economic trade-offs
and conflicts of interest that can potentially exist in the presence of commissions
in this market. On the one hand, commissions may distort brokers’ advice. On
the other hand, they can increase competition and efficiency upstream, leading to
overall lower prices. I now present motivating evidence suggesting both sides of the
trade-off are present in the UK mortgage market, and that the data supports the
inclusion of these forces in the model.
1.3.1 Brokers’ Advice and Commissions
Commissions from lenders can potentially bias brokers’ recommendations towards
high-commission products. This distortion can be detrimental for borrowers if
products offering high payments to brokers are also more expensive. Figure 1-4
illustrates this concern with a conceptual example using two lenders offering one
of the most popular products in the market: a two-year fixed, 75% loan-to-value
mortgage. Lender B’s product is always cheaper, but Lender A’s product pays a
higher commission to brokers. Despite being more expensive, Lender A’s product has
a higher market share via direct sales. Unobservable characteristics, such as more
advertisement or lax screening, could explain this gap in direct sales between lenders
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Figure 1-4: Example of (Potential) Distortion in a “Vanilla” Mortgage
Note: This figure illustrates prices, commissions, and sales for two different lenders offering one
of the most popular products in the market (2-year fixed, 75% LTV). Prices include interest rates
and lender fees, and commission rates are expressed as a percentage of the loan.
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A and B. The distortion that I would like to address in this section relates to the even
larger difference in market shares observed for intermediated sales. In particular, in
this subsection, I provide evidence showing that differences in commission payments
partly explain the gap in broker market shares.
It is not obvious that commissions will influence brokers’ sales choices. In the UK
mortgage market, mechanisms are in place that discipline brokers and help ensure
they act in their customers’ best interests. For example, given the high-frequency
of remortgaging in the UK market, repeated sales can align borrowers’ and brokers’
incentives. Brokers may maintain a good relationship with households in order to
ensure they return for future mortgage transactions. Indeed, in a recent consumer
survey, 68% of households said they were satisfied with their broker and would use
the same intermediary in the future.2 Brokers can also be motivated by reputation
concerns. Consumer surveys find that 23% of borrowers chose their broker because
a real estate agent recommended it, and 29% because a friend or relative suggested
it. Therefore, in a market where referrals seem to play a critical role, brokers are
less likely to engage in misconduct for fear of not being recommended in the future.
All in all, whether brokers are reacting to commissions despite repeated sales and
reputation concerns remains an empirical question.
In an attempt to capture the effect of commissions on brokers’ product choices, I
estimate the following fixed-effects specification at the product-broker-month-county
level:
Share bjtc = α + θ Commission blt + δjtc + γ btc + ψ blc + bjtc , (1.1)
where the dependent variable is the percentage share of product j in broker b’s sales
portfolio at month t in county c. The independent variable Commissionblt is the
per-sale commission rate that broker b receives from lender l in month t. To solve
some of the endogeneity concerns when regressing product shares on commissions,
2See Question M56 in the FCA’s consumer survey Financial Lives Survey 2017.
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I control for confounders by absorbing a rich set of fixed effects at the county
level. I include product-time-county fixed effects to account for time-varying product
characteristics that could affect brokers’ product preferences, such as interest rates,
advertisement, and fees. I also add broker-time-county fixed effects to control for
time-varying broker characteristics that could influence brokers’ choices, such as
their borrower cliente`le. Finally, I also add broker-lender-county fixed effects to
account for preexisting dealings between a broker and a lender that could result
in preferential treatment. This four-differences approach deals with the obvious
endogeneity concerns; however, the estimate for θ could still be biased if broker-
product-time-county-varying confounding variables exist. I will further discuss these
endogeneity issues when estimating the model. At that stage, I will try to address
these concerns using an instrumental variables approach exploiting time-variation
in cost-shifters at the broker-lender level.
Table 1.3 presents estimates for equation 1.1. The first column uses the entire
sample, and the second column focuses exclusively on first-time-buyers. Both spec-
ifications control for a rich set of fixed effects, resulting in a positive and significant
coefficient with values of 0.163 for all borrowers and 0.271 for first-time buyers.
Thus, products with a 13% (£100) higher commission rate for a broker have, on
average, almost a 2% higher market share within a broker’s portfolio. Table 1.3
shows suggestive evidence that, after controlling for the obvious confounders, brokers
seem to be reacting to changes in commission rates.
Estimates in Table 1.3 exploit within-broker-product variation across time within
a county. Results suggest changes in a product’s commission will, on average,
increase the products’ share within a broker’s sales portfolio. However, a broker’s
advice can also be biased across different products. For instance, brokers may
be more likely to recommend products with shorter fixed initial periods that will
require households to refinance more frequently. Brokers receive another commission
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payment each time borrowers need to remortgage. Brokers also have incentives to
push borrowers toward higher loan-to-value products. Because commissions are
expressed as a percentage of the loan amount, brokers may persuade households to
borrow as much as possible.3
Table 1.3: Product Market Shares and Commissions.
Dependent Variable: All Only
Product Market Share Borrowers FTBs
in Broker Sales (%) (1) (2)
Commission Rate 0.163* 0.271*
(% loan) (0.097) (0.180)
Product-Time-County FE Yes Yes
Broker-Time-County FE Yes Yes
Broker-Lender-County FE Yes Yes
Observations 327,750 153,416
Adjusted R-squared 0.953 0.937
Average Dependent 0.53 0.47
Variable (%)
Average Commission 0.40 0.41
Rate (%)
Average Total Commission 776 802
per Loan (£)
Note: The dependent variable is the product share in a broker’s sales portfolio each month in a
county. The commission rate is the percentage of the loan paid by the lender to the broker for the
sale of a product. Column (1) uses all borrowers, while Column (2) considers only first-time-buyers.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the broker and county levels, and (*) corresponds
to a p-value lower than 0.1.
3In the US, the media and consumer groups have argued that brokers advice to households to
borrow beyond their means exacerbated the financial crisis. See, for example, Pleven and Craig,
“Deal Fees under Fire Amid Mortgage Crisis; Guaranteed Rewards of Bankers, Middlemen Are in
the Spotlight,” Wall Street Journal, January 17, 2008; and ”Steered wrong: Brokers, borrowers,
and subprime loans,” Center for Responsible Lending, 2008. Similar concerns have been raised in
Europe by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s Report, ”Customer suitability in the
retail sale of financial products and services,” 2008.
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Both types of distortions are, however, difficult to identify empirically due to
selection into intermediation. Indeed, the data shows brokers selling more two-year
fixed mortgages (vs. three- and five-year fixed) and higher loan-to-value products
than the direct sales channel. Still, unobservable (to the econometrician) borrower
characteristics could explain these choices. Households originating their mortgages
through brokers may have different preferences than those going directly to lenders,
and brokers could be selecting the best products conditional on such (unobservable)
preferences. To get a sense of any evidence in the data that might suggest selection
into brokerage, I calculate borrowers’ propensity scores for buying mortgages with
(1) high loan-to-value and (2) a short initial fixed period. I use as predictors
the borrower’s characteristics (income, age, credit score, and whether it is a joint
application), property characteristics (house price and location), and month of the
year. Figure 1-5 plots these propensity scores separately for direct and intermediated
sales. Based on observable characteristics, borrowers going through brokers are
slightly more likely to buy a mortgage with high loan-to-value and short initial
period. However, I cannot reject that distributions for both channels are statistically
different. Unobservable product and borrower characteristics can be driving the
observed differences in choices between direct and intermediated sales. Brokers’
preferences over product characteristics could also be an explanation. In the model
in Section 2.2, I explicitly account for borrowers’ selection into intermediation and
brokers’ incentives both within and across product types. I am able to separately
identify the borrower and broker preferences over product characteristics, other than
commissions.
1.3.2 Upstream Competition and Commissions
Despite the recent uptake of online distribution channels in many markets, bank
branches still play a crucial role in mortgage originations in the UK. Panel A in
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Figure 1-5: Selection into Intermediation
PANEL A: Probability of Getting a 2-Year Mortgage
PANEL B: Probability of Getting a High Loan-to-Value Mortgage
Notes: Panel A shows for each sales channel the probability that a first-time-buyer get a
two-year mortgage based on its observable characteristics (age, income, credit score, partner,
house price, location) and month dummies. Panel B plots the analogous probability for
choosing a mortgage with a loan-to-value greater than 85%.
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Figure 1-6 shows that lenders with a more significant concentration of branches
in a given county account for a higher share of direct sales in that same county.
This strong positive correlation between direct sales and branch presence still holds
after adding lender and area fixed effects to account for local demand and lender
preferences. Moreover, recent changes in regulation implemented by the Mortgage
Market Review (MMR) in April 2014 have intensified the importance of bank
branches as a distribution channel. The MMR requires lenders to provide advice
for all sales that require any “interaction” with borrowers. Lenders have been very
conservative in their interpretation of these “interaction trigger” and now provide
lengthy advice to almost all of their borrowers, except for internal remortgagors.
Although some lenders give the option of speaking to an advisor over the phone,
most borrowers are redirected to the nearest branch for an appointment with a
specialized advisor to discuss their mortgage application. Both face-to-face and
telephone interviews of almost two hours on average. However, no such requirement
exists for borrowers originating their mortgages via brokers. Lenders seem to be
taking advantage of this fact and are using commissions to promote their products
to intermediaries in areas where borrowers would have to travel a significant distance
to their nearest branch for an interview. Panel B in Figure 1-6 shows that lenders
are also more likely to pay higher average commission rates in counties where they
have a lower concentration of branches. In such cases, commissions and brokers can
increase welfare by (1) lowering lenders’ distribution costs, (2) reducing borrowers’
origination costs and (3) increasing households’ available choice sets, especially in
the so-called “bank-branch deserts.”
Moreover, commissions also allow challenger banks to introduce and promote
their products in the market without the need to set up extensive (and expensive)
branch networks. Panel A in Figure 1-7 plots average interest and commission
rates for challenger and non-challenger lenders over my sample period, and Panel B
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Figure 1-6: Branches, Direct Sales and Commissions
PANEL A: Correlation between branches and direct sales
PANEL B: Correlation between branches and average commissions
Note: On the X-axes I sort all county-lender pairs according to the lender’s concentration of
branches in the county. In Panel A, I then average direct sales for each lender within a county. In
Panel B, I calculate the average commission rates for each lender within a county.
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Figure 1-7: Commissions and Market Shares across Lenders
PANEL A: Average commissions for the Big Six and challenger banks.
PANEL B: Market shares across lender types and sales channels.
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in Figure 1-7 shows the corresponding market shares for direct and intermediated
sales channels. On average, challenger banks pay higher commission rates and
account for a higher market share in brokers’ sales than in direct sales. To formalize
this relationship between challenger banks and intermediated sales, I estimate the
following specification:
Challenger ijt = α + δ Intermediated ijt + βXijt + ijt , (1.2)
where Challenger ijt is a dummy equal to one if household i at time t purchased
mortgage product j from a challenger bank, and zero otherwise. The independent
variable Intermediated ijt is a dummy variable equal to one if the household origi-
nated the mortgage through a broker, and zero if it used the direct channel instead.
Covariates Xijt control for observable borrower, product, geographical, and time-
period characteristics.
Table 1.4 shows estimates for equation 1.2. After controlling for borrower and
product characteristics and year-month and county fixed effects, first-time-buyers
going to a broker have a 7% higher probability of originating their mortgage through
a challenger bank. Although this relationship can be driven by unobservables and
selection into intermediation, brokers seem to be increasing challenger banks’ market
shares. Given that for many products in the market, challenger banks offer better
rates than the Big Six, commissions can benefit households via their allocative
role in the broker channel, inducing higher matching rates between borrowers and
challenger banks.
1.4 The Need for a Model
The results in the preceding subsections 1.3.1 and 1.3.2 point to a key trade-off
emerging from the presence of brokers in this market. On the one hand, brokers’
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Table 1.4: Probability of Getting a Product from a Challenger Bank.
Dependent Variable: All Borrowers First-Time-Buyers
Challenger (0/1) (exc. Internal Remortgagors) Only
(1) (2)
Intermediated 0.0476*** 0.0674***
(0.001) (0.003)
Max. LTV Band FE Yes Yes
Fixed Period FE Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes
Year-Month FE Yes Yes
Borrower Characteristics Yes Yes
(income, age, credit score)
Observations 489,352 159,486
R-squared 0.24 0.33
Note: The unit of observation is at the household level. Dependent variable is a dummy equal to
one if the borrower chose a mortgage from a challenger bank. Robust standard errors in parentheses
such that (***) corresponds to a p-value lower than 0.01.
advice can be distorted towards high-commission products, potentially reducing
consumer surplus. On the other hand, brokers allow challenger banks to introduce
their products without the need to invest in an extensive branch network, increasing
competition upstream and potentially leading to lower prices. Moreover, brokers also
allow established banks to promote their products in areas where they have limited
branch density, reducing their distributional costs and eventually resulting in effi-
ciency gains and lower prices. Finally, as shown in section 3.2.1, consumers currently
pay very low fees (in many instances, no fee at all) when hiring a broker. These low
charges are possible only because brokers are getting most of their revenue directly
from lenders. Commission payments decrease the price consumers pay for valuable
expert services that reduce household search costs and increase the information on
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available products. Given these trade-offs, the net effect of commissions on consumer
surplus depends on which of all these forces dominates in equilibrium.
To evaluate the overall impact of regulating broker payments, it is necessary
to empirically assessing the relative sizes of these effects on consumer surplus.
This may prove to be difficult for three reasons. First, no counterfactual scenario
regulating commissions exists in this market. This limitation precludes evaluating
the performance of such a policy in this context. The second challenge arises
due to selection into intermediation. Consumers decide whether to hire a broker,
based on observable and unobservable (to the econometrician) characteristics of
both the borrower and the broker. Therefore, in the presence of this endogenous
choice, reduced-form methods would require strong assumptions when evaluating
such behavior, which could ultimately bias the resulting estimates. Finally, contract
negotiations between lenders and brokers endogenously determine commission pay-
ments in this market. To evaluate the effects of a hypothetical cap or ban on such
commissions, understanding the incentives and the trade-offs lenders and brokers
face when deciding whom to include or exclude from their sales networks and what
commissions to set in such agreements is necessary.
In Chapter 2, I present and quantify a structural model of the UK mortgage
market that features all trade-offs discussed above. Such a framework will help
overcome the empirical limitations described in this section and will enable me to
quantify the net effect on consumer surplus of restricting upstream commissions.
The goal of the next chapter is to evaluate policies similar to those implemented by
regulators worldwide.
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Chapter 2
Regulating Broker Compensation
in the UK Mortgage Market
2.1 Introduction
In many financial markets, expert advisors often receive commission payments from
upstream firms. In theory, this form of compensation can generate an agency prob-
lem between experts and households by distorting advice towards higher-commission,
more expensive products. Motivated by consumer detriment due to biased advice,
regulators worldwide have recently restricted financial relationships between up-
stream firms and expert advisors.1 Although these policies might help align experts’
incentives with those of consumers, they will also have supply-side equilibrium
effects on competition and efficiency in the market. The empirical evidence on
these equilibrium effects is, however, very limited. This chapter contributes to this
1Examples of these initiatives include the Retail Distribution Review in the UK, which resulted
in a ban on all upstream commissions for retail investment advice. The Netherlands and Australia
have also introduced comparable bans on commission payments for complex financial products,
and other countries such as Canada are currently considering the possibility of taking similar
measures. In the US, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau recently introduced new loan
originator compensation requirements under the Truth in Lending Act. These new requirements
restrict mortgage brokers’ upstream payments.
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debate by modeling and quantifying the effects on welfare and market structure of
regulations restricting payments between lenders and brokers in mortgage markets.
Understanding the financial relationships between lenders and mortgage brokers is
important both because of the central role mortgage markets have in the consumer
credit landscape (where brokerage is often households’ most preferred option) and
because of the economic and policy implications of similar restrictions in other
markets (e.g., insurance, retail investment, and real estate).
With the empirical evidence presented in Chapter 1 in mind, I develop a struc-
tural model of the UK mortgage market that I later estimate and use to quantify
the net effect of restricting commission payments on welfare. The model features (1)
utility-maximizing households in need of a mortgage for the purchase of a residential
property, (2) heterogeneous multi-product lenders selling differentiated mortgage
products and competing on interest rates, and (3) broker firms providing advice
to households on available products and processing all application and origination
paperwork. On the supply side, I endogenize commission payments in this market
by modeling negotiations between a broker and a lender as a Nash bargaining game.
Each pair bargains over the lender’s inclusion in the broker’s network. In the event
of an agreement, the pair sets a per-sale commission, and the broker can originate
the lender’s mortgages. Once all negotiations end, each lender chooses interest rates
to maximize its expected profits. On the demand side, I model households’ choice
of distribution channel as a discrete choice between hiring a broker or going directly
to lenders’ in-house distribution channels (e.g., branches). This decision depends on
the households’ search costs and their expected payoffs from each channel. After
choosing a distribution channel, the household needs to decide on a mortgage prod-
uct. I model this part of demand as a discrete logit with households’ preferences
being a function of interest rates, product characteristics, and latent demand. Broker
preferences over commissions and other product characteristics will also matter for
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those households that selected the intermediated channel.
Demand estimates show the following: (1) Brokers have downstream market
power and can extract surplus from consumers, confirming the existence of an agency
problem between households and brokers; (2) average household search costs account
for almost 20% of consumer surplus, implying the average household finds it very
costly to originate a mortgage on its own; and (3) households going directly to
lenders have a preference for nearby branches. This taste for branch proximity
disappears for households hiring a broker. Consumers originating their mortgages
via the direct channel face stronger lender market power (at the local level) than
those choosing the intermediated channel. Thus, changes in competition across
lenders have a differential impact on households, depending on their choice of sales
channel.
On the supply side, I find that lenders’ marginal costs are on average greater
for higher loan-to-value bands and products with longer initial fixed periods. Ad-
ditionally, estimates show that lenders’ marginal costs differ depending on the sales
channel, with broker sales being less costly than direct sales. Thus, brokers improve
efficiency in the market by reducing costs both for lenders (via lower marginal costs)
and households (via lower search costs). Finally, the estimated bargaining param-
eters reject take-it-or-leave-it offers as a model for setting commission payments in
this market.
Next, I use these estimates to simulate welfare effects of policies restricting
brokerage services and commissions. A counterfactual simulation with no brokers
results in a drop of 51% in consumer surplus. This decrease is driven by a 156%
increase in search costs for households, a 13% increase in lenders’ marginal costs,
and a 35% increase in the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The decrease in
competition results from consumers going direct having a preference for nearby
branches and only the largest lenders having a dense branch network. Overall,
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the combination of these three equilibrium effects results in 24% higher prices and
consumers being worse off than in the baseline with broker services.
Next, I consider counterfactual scenarios with a complete ban on commissions
(motivated by recent regulations) and three different caps. Two countervailing forces
largely determine my results: broker and lender market power. Households choosing
the intermediated channel face broker market power, resulting from brokers’ capac-
ity to extract surplus from the household. Households originating their mortgage
directly with lenders experience local lender market power, driven mainly by the
presence of nearby branches. When compared with the baseline with no restrictions
on commissions, a ban reduces broker market power at the expense of increasing
lender market power. In this situation, the price of expert services increases for
households, causing 115% more households to choose lenders’ in-house distribution
channels and increasing search costs by 83%. Due to the lack of extensive branch
networks, the share of challenger banks goes down by 16% with the HHI increasing
by 21%. Lenders’ average marginal cost goes up by 7%, causing prices to rise by
11%. The net effect of these forces is a 25% decrease in consumer surplus.
Alternatively, I find that a cap equal to the median commission payment in the
baseline case with no restrictions generates a 10% increase in consumer surplus. In
this scenario, the decrease in broker market power is sufficiently large to compensate
for the increase in lender market power. The intuition is that a cap still allows
brokers to get revenue from lenders, causing household broker fees to increase but
not as much as in the case of a ban. Therefore, although the share of direct sales
increases by 30%, the competition effect of challenger banks dominates and prices
fall by 5%. Overall, these findings are evidence in favor of capping, rather than
banning, commission payments in markets where consumers can access the good
not only through intermediaries, but also directly from upstream firms. The trade-
offs for competition and efficiency need to be considered when implementing similar
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policies in other markets where consumers face high search costs and brokers and
lenders have market power.
Contributions to the Literature. This paper contributes mainly to three strands
of literature. First, it complements existing approaches in household finance (Camp-
bell and Cocco, 2003; Campbell, 2012; Best et al., 2018; DeFusco and Paciorek,
2017) by analyzing the role that brokers play in borrowers’ demand in mortgage
markets (often dominated by intermediated sales). Woodward and Hall (2010, 2012)
consider broker fees when analyzing originations in the US mortgage market. They
find evidence of significant price dispersion in broker fees and show that groups that
are likely less informed pay higher brokerage fees. Jiang et al. (2014) also study the
role of mortgage brokers on mortgage delinquency between 2004 and 2008. They
find that brokers originated lower-quality loans, which were 50% more likely to
be delinquent than bank-originated loans. These papers focus on the interactions
between brokers and borrowers, and how brokers’ financial incentives can generate
biased advice and be detrimental for consumers. I contribute by explicitly account-
ing for supply-driven equilibrium effects that may increase consumer surplus via
more upstream competition, lower search costs, and lower prices. This paper is also
the first to develop a structural model to quantify welfare effects from regulations
imposing restrictions on brokers’ financial incentives. In that sense, my work adds
to the recent trend of using structural techniques to analyze markets with financial
products, such as pensions (Hastings et al., 2017), insurance (Koijen and Yogo,
2016), retail deposits (Egan et al., 2017), corporate lending (Crawford et al., 2018b),
credit cards (Nelson, 2017), and mortgages (Benetton, 2018).
Second, this paper fits into a vast literature on the role of intermediaries. In-
termediaries can create value by guaranteeing quality and certifying information
(Biglaiser et al., 2017; Biglaiser and Li, 2018), which can alleviate information
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asymmetries in many markets, such as labor markets (David, 2008, Stanton and
Thomas, 2015) and insurance markets (Anagol et al., 2017). Intermediaries can also
lessen trading frictions (Gavazza, 2016), reduce search costs (Salz, 2017), promote
innovation and adoption of new technologies (Howells, 2006), and facilitate entry
(Ahn et al., 2011). This paper is closest to settings in which intermediaries take the
form of expert advisors and adds to the growing empirical literature that examines
agency problems in expert services. For example, in the prescription drug market,
Iizuka (2007, 2012) and Ho and Pakes (2014) find doctors react to financial incentives
when dispensing generic drugs. Financial advisors are also not immune to conflicts
of interest, with many of them having misconduct records and being repeat offenders
(Egan et al., 2018). In the housing market, Levitt and Syverson (2008) show how real
estate agents exploit their informational advantage to their financial benefit when
advising clients on the timing and sales price of their houses. Similarly, Guiso et al.
(2018) find evidence of distorted advice when analyzing lenders’ in-house mortgage
recommendations to borrowers. Financial incentives can also amplify the effects of
high search costs by inducing brokers to steer consumers towards inferior products
(Egan, 2018).
Though closely related, this paper differs from prior work on expert advisors
in that it estimates welfare effects from a policy restricting supply-side financial
incentives. A recent theoretical literature that, similar in spirit to this paper,
analyzes market effects in the presence of commission payments to financial advisors
(e.g., Inderst and Ottaviani, 2009, 2012a,b,c; Inderst, 2015; Heidhues et al., 2016;
Martimort et al., 2017). However, given the possible trade-offs in the market, the
overall effect on consumers of banning such commissions is theoretically ambiguous.
The empirical literature on the topic is almost inexistent. Grennan et al. (2018)
study payments between pharmaceutical firms and physicians. They use a structural
model to estimate the equilibrium response of prices and quantities to a ban on these
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financial incentives and find a positive effect on consumer welfare of such policy.
This paper differs from their approach in that it analyzes intermediation services
in financial markets, which face different trade-offs than those in the healthcare
sector. For example, in many financial markets, consumers can directly access
providers without the need to consult with an expert advisor, which is often not
the case for medical treatments. Therefore, in market structures where consumers
can bypass the intermediary, the exposure of households to market power from
providers and intermediaries differs from settings similar to that in Grennan et al.
(2018). These differences lead to contrasting welfare effects of policies restricting
upstream payments.
Finally, my analysis relates to the recent empirical literature on bargaining.
Many of the existing papers focus on the healthcare sector and the interactions
between hospitals, insurance companies, suppliers, and firms (see, e.g., Grennan,
2013, Gowrisankaran et al., 2015, Ho, 2009, Ho and Lee, 2017a, Ho and Lee, 2017b,
Grennan and Swanson, 2016), and on the telecommunications industry and the
relationships between television channels, programming distributors, and viewers
(see, e.g., Crawford and Yurukoglu, 2012, Crawford et al., 2018a). This paper is
the first to introduce bargaining to analyze vertical payments in credit markets.
Moreover, this work also contributes to the literature by modeling a bargaining
game in markets where consumers have the option to bypass the intermediary and
directly purchase the good from providers via their in-house distribution chan-
nels. This type of vertical structure is also analyzed in Donna et al. (2018) for
the Portuguese outdoor advertising industry. Similarly to their setting, in my
framework when providers and intermediaries negotiate, they acknowledge that
their relationship is both vertical (intermediaries provide an alternative distribution
channel for providers) and horizontal (intermediaries compete with providers’ in-
house distribution channels). I exploit this vertical-horizontal structure in a novel
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identification strategy using geographical and time variation in lenders’ branch
networks and their outside options to access consumers.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 2.2, I develop a general
equilibrium model for the mortgage market capturing the key trade-offs described
in Chapter 1. In Section 2.3, I discuss estimation and identification of the demand
and supply. Section 2.4 presents the estimation results. Section 2.5 performs
counterfactual and welfare analysis of restricting upstream payments. Section 2.6
concludes.
2.2 A Model of the UK Mortgage Market
2.2.1 Set-up
In this section, I develop a structural model of the UK mortgage market that
predicts: (i) household demand for mortgage products, (ii) household demand for
brokerage services, (iii) interest rates offered by lenders, and (iv) negotiated lender-
broker-specific sales commissions. I later estimate this model and use it as a tool to
simulate counterfactual policy analysis.
The model focuses on the interactions between lenders, brokers, and households
in the UK mortgage market. Figure 2-1 describes the vertical and horizontal rela-
tions in this market between all main players. A household consists of one or two
potential borrowers in need of a mortgage for the purchase of a residential property.
A lender is a bank or building society selling differentiated mortgage products to
households. A broker is a firm that helps households get a mortgage by providing
advice on available products and sorting out application and origination paperwork
with the lender. The timing of events is as follows. First, brokers negotiate with
lenders for the terms of lenders’ inclusion in the brokers’ networks. If successful,
these bilateral negotiations determine the set of commissions paid by lenders to
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Figure 2-1: Vertical and Horizontal Relations in the UK Mortgage Market
Lenders
Provide mortgage products
Broker Companies
Give advice on available products,
help with application paperwork
Households
In need of mortgage
for residential purposes
Lenders’ Sales Channels
Branch, online and phone sales
Commission
payment (£)
Mortgage
product
Help and
advice
Broker
fee (£)
Distribution
channel
Mortgage
product
Note: The diagram displays the main vertical relations in the UK mortgage market. Households
in need of a mortgage can pay a fee and hire a broker company to provide them with advice on
available products and help them with all paperwork involved in the application and origination
of the mortgage. The broker will also receive a commission payment from the lender for each sale.
Households can also bypass the broker and access the lender’s distribution channels directly via
bank branches and online and phone sales.
brokers for the sale of any given product. Next, lenders set prices in the form
of interest rates for all their mortgage products. Finally, households decide on a
sales channel, that is, whether to hire a broker or use lenders’ in-house distribution
channels (e.g., branches). I will refer to the former as the intermediated channel and
to the latter as the direct channel. Once households have chosen a sales channel, they
acquire one of the available mortgage products through that channel. In this setting,
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lender-broker bargaining and lenders’ mortgage pricing constitute the supply side
of the market, whereas households’ choice of sales channel and mortgage product
captures the demand side.
2.2.2 Demand
Assume there are markets labeled t = 1, ..., T , each with households indexed by
i = 1, ..., It and with heterogeneous search costs and preferences across product
characteristics. I define a market as half-year in my data, and each household
can only be active in one market and purchase only one product. In each market
there are l = 1, ..., Lt lenders, each selling Jlt horizontally differentiated mortgage
products, indexed by j = 1, .., Jlt. Likewise, each market has Bt brokers, indexed by
b = 1, ..., Bt.
Mortgage Product Choice
In the last stage, after selecting a sales channel, households choose one of the
available mortgage products. I follow the characteristics approach (Lancaster, 1979)
and assume households’ mortgage demand is a function of observable household
characteristics, random preferences, product attributes, and a vector of preference
parameters. I also assume that the problem households face when choosing a
mortgage product will differ depending on their chosen sales channel, which is
predetermined at this stage.
Direct Channel. Consider household i in market t that has opted for lenders’
in-house distribution channels. I make the parametric assumption that the indirect
utility of such household has the following linear form:
V Dijlt = α rjlt + β Xjl + ξjlt + λ Branchesilt + ijlt , (2.1)
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where rjlt is the interest rate of product j offered by lender l in market t; Xjl are
time-invariant product characteristics including lender, maximum loan-to-value, and
initial fixed period; ξjlt captures unobservable product-lender-market characteristics
affecting household utility in a market (e.g., advertising, screening); and ijlt is an
idiosyncratic taste shock. Finally, Branchesilt accounts for the number of branches
that lender l has in household i’s county, and λ is the associated preference pa-
rameter. By adding branches in the horizontal differentiation dimension, I account
for costs associated with application and origination processes that households may
face, along the lines of Hastings et al. (2017) and Benetton (2018).
Household i will purchase mortgage product jl if and only if it attains the highest
utility among all available products in the household’s consideration choice set, Cit,
which I assume is household specific and restricted by household characteristics.
That is, household i will choose product j from lender l if (1) it is part of the
available choice set, and (2) V Dijlt > V
D
ikst, ∀ks ∈ Cit. Consider V11, V21, ..., Vjl, ..., VJL
to be the utilities for all product-lender alternatives, where J and L are the number
of products and lenders in choice set Cit, respectively. Then, the probability that
alternative jl is chosen at a purchase occasion is:
sijlt = Pr ( jl chosen | Cit) = Pr ( V Dijlt > V Dikst for all ks ∈ Cit) . (2.2)
Intermediated Channel. Consider now household i′ has hired broker b in market
t. Let b(i′) denote this broker-household pair. I assume that each broker-household
pair b(i′) is a composite agent that maximizes the joint indirect utility, which I
assume to be a weighted average of the indirect utility of the household, V bijlt, and
that of the broker, Wbjlt. Moreover, I make the parametric assumption that the
indirect utility of the pair b(i′) for the purchase of product j from lender l in market
t takes the following form:
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Vb(i′)jlt = (1− θb) (β Xjl + α rjlt + ξjlt + ijlt )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Household’s Utility (V bijt)
+ θb ( γ1 clbt + γ2 Xjl + ζblt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Broker’s Utility (Wbjlt)
,
(2.3)
where the indirect utility of the broker includes a percentage commission clbt that
broker b receives from lender l, as well as product characteristics over which the
broker may have some preferences. For example, brokers may prefer products
with shorter initial fixed periods. These type of products incentivize households to
refinance more frequently, which in turn leads to more business (and commissions)
for brokers. Moreover, brokers may prefer higher loan-to-value products because
commissions are expressed as a percentage of the loan. I also account for the possi-
bility of brokers’ preferences being affected by unobservable (to the econometrician)
broker-lender-market characteristics, ζblt, such as preferential treatment. Parameter
θb in equation 2.3 captures the average downstream market power of broker b and
the share of surplus a broker can extract from her average client. This parameter
captures the magnitude of the agency problem households face when dealing with
broker b and the influence/negotiation power the latter has over the consumer. If θb
is equal to zero, then then the broker is fully benevolent in the sense that demand-
side incentives are so large that brokers’ and households’ incentives are fully aligned.
If, on the other hand, θb is equal to one, then supply-side incentives fully dominate,
and the broker can extract all surplus from households. Finally, households’ indirect
utility is analogous to that of equation 2.1 in the direct channel, with the exception
that bank branches do not play a role when getting a mortgage through a broker.2
2Reduced-form evidence in Section 1.3.2 suggests that branch presence matters only for direct
sales. Moreover, when adding this coefficient in the estimation for broker sales, the effect is small
and not significantly different from zero. After controlling for commissions, branch proximity does
not seem to play a role when originating a mortgage through a broker.
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Each broker-household pair maximizes the joint indirect utility subject to their
available choice set, Cb(i′)t. This choice set is broker-household specific, and it is
restricted by household characteristics (as in the direct channel), but also by broker
b’s network of lenders. At this stage, a broker can only originate mortgages with
lenders with whom she reached an agreement in the previous bargaining stage. I
denote this subset of lenders Nbt. Therefore, broker-household b(i
′) will choose
product j from lender l in Nbt if (1) it is part of the available choice set Cb(i′)t, and
(2) Vb(i′)jlt > Vb(i′)kst, ∀ ks ∈ Cb(i′)t. Finally, the probability that product jl is
chosen, sb(i′)jlt, conditional on the available choice set, Cb(i′)t, is analogous to the
one defined in equation 2.2 for the direct channel.
Sales Channel Choice
Before choosing a mortgage product, households need to decide whether to go
directly to lenders’ in-house distribution channels or hire a broker. I assume each
household i has a search cost κi. This search cost is a fixed cost that households incur
when gathering information on all products available to them in market t. I assume
search costs are heterogeneous and assigned via i.i.d. draws from a distribution Fκ.
If household i decides to use the direct sales channel, it will incur the search cost
κi to learn about available products and to deal with the administrative aspects of
the application. Household i can also choose the brokerage option. In this case, the
household is matched to broker b with probability pibit and has to pay a broker fee
fbit for the broker’s services. I assume (1) households do not search across brokers,
and (2) no competition exists among brokers. Therefore, I consider broker fees as
exogenous.3
Household i will choose the sales channel that provides the highest (net) ex-ante
3As already presented in Figure A-1, broker fees in this market are significantly low, with many
broker companies offering their services at no cost for the borrower. Thus, households always have
the option to hire brokerage services at a zero fee.
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expected utility, which depends on the household’s search cost, broker fees, and
ex-ante expected maximum indirect utility from each sales channel. Let κˆi be the
search cost that makes household i indifferent between both sales channels. This
indifference cut-off value is:
E
[
max
jl
V Dijlt (η) |Direct
] − κˆi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direct Channel
=
∑
b∈Bt
pib(i)t
(
E
[
max
jl
Vb(i)jlt (η) | b
]− αifbit)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Broker Channel
,
(2.4)
where η is a vector of all household-preference parameters; E
[
maxjl Vijlt (η)|Direct
]
and E
[
maxjl Vb(i)jlt(η)|b
]
are the ex-ante expected household utilities of household i
going directly to the lender and hiring broker b, respectively; pib(i)t is the probability
that household i is matched to broker b; and fbit is the broker fee paid by household
i when hiring broker b. I multiply the fee by the price coefficient, αi in equations 2.1
and 2.3, to transform money into utils and make the fee comparable to the expected
utilities. This indifference condition in equation 2.4 implies that, if household i has
a search-cost draw κi that is greater than κˆi, it will choose to hire a broker. If it
has a search-cost draw κi smaller than κˆi, it will opt for the direct sales channel and
search for a mortgage across lenders’ in-house distribution channels.
2.2.3 Supply
Lender Mortgage Pricing
Each market t contains Lt lenders that are for-profit organizations selling mortgage
products to households. They maximize expected profits by setting interest rates
(prices) for each of their products. I define the set of products offered by lender l in
market t as Jlt. Lender l’s profits from a direct sale of product j in market t are:
ΠDjt = tj (rjt −mcDjt) , (2.5)
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where tj is the initial fixed period for product j, rjt is the initial rate for that
product in market t, and mcDjt is the marginal cost of selling product j in market
t through a direct distribution channel. Similarly, lender l’s profits from selling
product j in Jlt in market t via an intermediated sale from broker b are:
Πbjt = tj (rjt −mcBjt)− clbt , (2.6)
where clbt is the commission paid to broker b in market t for the sale of product
j from lender l, and mcBjt is the marginal cost of selling product j in market t
through the broker channel. I allow for marginal costs to vary across sales channels,
because there could be ways in which brokers reduce lenders’ origination costs (e.g.,
screening, income verification). I also implicitly assume that a household’s loan
quantity choice is equal to one, and it is not affected by changes in the interest rate.
That is, a change in the interest rate will affect households’ choice probabilities
across products, but not the associated loan amount (conditional on the loan-to-
value bands). Therefore, I am only accounting for households’ discrete choice in
lenders’ profits, as opposed to previous work that also endogeneizes households’
choice of loan amount (see Benetton, 2018). Finally, I am assuming all households
remortgage at the end of the initial period (see Cloyne et al., 2017) and no default.
Using demand choice probabilities as defined by equation 2.2 and cut-off search
costs as characterized in equation 2.4, lender l’s expected profits from serving
household i in market t are:
Πlit = Fκ(κˆi) ∗
∑
j∈Jlt
(
sijlt ∗ ΠDjt
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Revenue from Direct Sales
+
[
1− Fκ(κˆi)
] ∗∑
j∈Jlt
∑
b∈Nlt
(
pib(i)t ∗ sb(i)jt ∗ Πbjt
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Revenue from Broker Sales
,
(2.7)
where sijlt and sb(i)jt are choice probabilities for household i choosing product jl
conditional on choice channel, Fκ(κˆi) represents the probability that household i
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will choose to go directly to the lender’s distribution channel, and 1−Fκ(κˆit) is the
probability that it will decide to hire a broker. Conditional on other lenders’ interest
rates, lender l will decide in each market t the initial rate for each product j in Jlt
that maximizes the sum of equation 2.7 across all households in each market. Thus,
in each market, lender l solves the following maximization problem:
max
{rjt}j∈Jlt
Πlt =
∑
i∈It
Πlit(r1t, ..., rJlt) , (2.8)
with the corresponding first-order conditions with respect to the interest rate of
product j in market t given by:
∂Πlt
∂rjt
=
∑
i∈It
[
Fκ(κˆit) ∗ sijlt ∗ tj
+ Fκ(κˆit)
∑
k∈Jlt
∂siklt
∂rjt
∗ [tk (rkt −mcDkt)]
+ fκ(κˆit) ∗ ∂κˆim
∂rjt
∑
k∈Jlt
siklt ∗
[
tk(rkt −mcDkt)
]
+
[
1− Fκ(κˆit)
] B∑
b=1
pib(i)t ∗ sb(i)jlt ∗ tj
+
[
1− Fκ(κˆit)
] B∑
b=1
pib(i)t
∑
k∈Jlt
∂sb(i)klt
∂rjt
∗ [tk (rkt −mcBkt)− clbt]
]
− fκ(κˆit) ∗ ∂κˆit
∂rjt
B∑
b=1
pib(i)t
∑
k∈Jlt
sb(i)klt ∗
[
tk (rkt −mcBkt)− clbt
] ]
= 0 ∀j ∈ Jlt .
(2.9)
In (2.9), the first and fourth terms capture the extra profits for both direct and
intermediated sales due to a higher interest rate. The second and fifth terms show the
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effect of higher rates on choice probabilities for all products from lender l. Finally,
the third and last terms capture the change in the probability of households choosing
the direct channel due to higher interest rates. Solving for the interest rate in (2.9)
gives the following (I omit the market subscript for simplicity):
r∗j =
∑
i∈Im
[
mcDj ρ
D
j +
B∑
b=1
pib(i)(mc
B
j +
clb
tj
) ρbj︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effective average marginal cost
− Fκˆ sijl
ρDj
Fκˆ
∂sijl
∂rj
+ fκˆ
∂κˆi
∂rj
sijl︸ ︷︷ ︸
Full mark-up (I)
− (1− Fκˆ)
B∑
b=1
pib(i) sb(i)jl
ρbj
(1− Fκˆ) ∂sb(i)jl∂rj − fκˆ ∂κˆi∂rj sb(i)jl︸ ︷︷ ︸
Full mark-up (II)
−
∑
k 6=j∈Jl
1
tj
(
Fκˆ
∂sikl
∂rj
+ fκˆ
∂κˆ
∂rj
sikl
) ΠDk ρDk
Fκˆ
∂sijl
∂rj
+ fκˆ
∂κˆi
∂rj
sijl︸ ︷︷ ︸
Other products via direct
−
∑
k 6=j∈Jl
1
tj
B∑
b=1
pib(i)
(
(1− Fκˆ) ∂sb(i)kl
∂rj
− fκˆ ∂κˆ
∂rj
sb(i)kl
)
×︸ ︷︷ ︸
Other products via brokers (I)
× Π
B
k ρ
b
k
(1− Fκˆ) ∂sb(i)jl∂rj − fκˆ ∂κˆi∂rj sb(i)jl︸ ︷︷ ︸
Other products via brokers (II)
]
,
(2.10)
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where ρDj is the effective probability of household i going direct and purchasing
product j. Likewise, ρbj is the effective probability of household i going to broker
and purchasing product j. Expressions for both ρDj and ρ
b
j are:
ρDj =
Fκˆ
∂sijl
∂rj
+ fκˆ
∂κˆi
∂rj
sijl[
Fκˆ
∂sijl
∂rj
+ fκˆ
∂κˆi
∂rj
sijl + (1− Fκˆ)
∑
b∈B pib(i)
∂sb(i)jl
∂rj
− fκˆ ∂κˆi∂rj
∑
b∈B pib(i) sb(i)jl
]
(2.11)
and
ρbj =
(1− Fκˆ) ∂sb(i)jl∂rj − fκˆ ∂κˆi∂rj sb(i)jl[
Fκˆ
∂sijl
∂rj
+ fκˆ
∂κˆi
∂rj
sijl + (1− Fκˆ)
∑
b∈B pib(i)
∂sb(i)jl
∂rj
− fκˆ ∂κˆi∂rj
∑
b∈B pib(i) sb(i)jl
] .
(2.12)
Note that if no brokers exist in the market and all lenders offer only one product,
expression (2.10) collapses to the standard mark-up pricing formula:
r∗j =
∑
i∈Im
(
mcDj − sijl ×
(
∂sijl
∂rj
)−1)
.
Broker-Lender Bargaining over Commissions
In each market t, before setting prices and making any sales, brokers and lenders
bilaterally meet and bargain a´ la Nash to determine whether to form an agreement.
If successful, they set a per-sale commission that is expressed as a percentage of
the final loan amount. Lt ×Bt contracts are possible, and brokers and lenders have
complete information about all payoff functions. I assume the negotiated commission
for each contract solves the Nash bargaining solution for that contract. Thus, the
equilibrium commission vector maximizes the Nash product of each pair’s gains from
trade, conditional on agreements reached by all other pairs. Moreover, given that the
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agreement value for a broker dealing with a given lender may change depending on
whether she has reached an agreement with another lender with similar mortgage
products, I also assume each contract remains the same even if negotiation for
another contract fails. Thus, all negotiations within market t are simultaneous
and separate, such that commissions set in other meetings are not known but
conjectured. This setting is motivated by the model presented in Horn and Wolinsky
(1988), and it is commonly used by other empirical papers (see, e.g., Crawford and
Yurukoglu, 2012, Grennan, 2013, Gowrisankaran et al., 2015, Ho and Lee, 2017a,b,
Crawford et al., 2018a).4 Despite these assumptions, lenders and brokers’ payoffs
will still depend on outcomes of bilateral negotiations to which they are not party. I
start by considering the ex-ante payoff structures for brokers and lenders, and their
resulting participation constraints. I then show the Nash bargaining solution to each
contract.
Each broker seeks to maximize his ex-ante expected payoff from serving all
households that hire his services. Given lenders’ expected rates and households’
expected mortgage and sales channel choices, the ex-ante expected utility for broker
b in market t, as a function of commissions and network structure Nbt, is:
Wbt(cbt, Nbt) =
∑
i∈It
(
1−Fκ[κˆi(ct)]
)
∗pib(i)t ∗
∑
j∈Jb(i)t,Nbt
sb(i)jlt(cbt) Wbljt(clbt) , (2.13)
where cbt is all commissions payments of broker b and Wbjlt(clbt) is the broker’s
utility from originating product j with lender l in market t as defined in equation
2.3. Brokers’ ex-ante utility also depends on households’ probability of choosing the
brokerage channel, (1−Fκ[κˆit(ct)]), which is a function of commission payments for
all brokers in market t. Similarly, the ex-ante expected profits to lender l in market
t, conditional on commissions and network structure Nlt, are:
4Recently, Collard-Wexler et al. (2018) have provided a non-cooperative foundation for this
bargaining solution based on Rubinstein’s model of alternating offer bargaining.
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Πlt(clt, Nlt) =
∑
i∈It
(
Fκ[κˆit(ct)]
∑
j∈Jlt
(
sijlt ∗ ΠDjt
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Revenue from Direct Sales
+
[
1− Fκ[κˆit(ct)]
]∑
j∈Jlt
∑
b∈Nlt
(
pib(i)t ∗ sb(i)jt ∗ Πbjt(clbt)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Revenue from Broker Sales
)
,
(2.14)
where ct are all commissions in market t and clt is a vector with all commissions
paid by lender l in market t. Lender profits are defined by equations (2.5) and (2.6).
Brokers and lenders’ ex-ante expected profits are key in the Nash bargaining
model, because they determine the agreement and disagreement payoffs. Using
equations (2.13) and (2.7), the exponentiated product of the net payoffs from agree-
ment is:
NP lbt (clbt|c−lbt) = [ Πlt(clbt|c−lbt)− Πlt(0 |c−lbt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gains from trade for lender l
] βlb
× [Wbt(clbt|c−lbt;Nbt)−Wbt(0 |c−lbt;Nbt \ Jl)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gains from trade for broker b
] 1−βlb ,
(2.15)
where βlb is the bargaining power of lender l when negotiating with broker b. Setting
βlb = 0.5 assumes symmetric Nash bargaining, and setting βlb = 0 assumes Nash-
Bertrand pricing behavior by lenders. Disagreement payoffs imply all commissions
for broker b for the sale of all products from lender l are set to zero. That is, I
treat products for each lender as an indivisible block, meaning that if bargaining
breaks down between a lender and a broker, the broker cannot originate any of the
lender’s products and the lender will not be part of the broker’s network. Moreover,
I assume lenders face no capacity constraints. Hence, in the event of a disagreement
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between a lender and a broker, the broker can originate a mortgage with his ex-post
second choice of lender without facing any restrictions on the lender’s side.
I define the Nash bargaining solution as the commission vector c∗t that maximizes
equation (2.15) for each Nash bargaining contract, conditioning on the outcomes of
all other contracts. Therefore, each c∗lbt in c
∗
t solves the following maximization
problem:
max
clbt
NP lbt (clbt|c∗−lbt) such that
(1) Πlt(clbt|c∗−lbt;Nlt)− Πlt(0 |c∗−lbt;Nlt \ b) ≥ 0 (Lender PC)
(2) Wbt(clbt|c∗−lbt;Nbt)−Wbt(0 |c∗−lbt;Nbt \ Jl) ≥ 0 (Broker PC) ,
where c∗−lbt is the equilibrium commission vector, excluding the commission of the
lender-broker pair in the negotiation. (1) and (2) are participation constraints for
the lender and broker, respectively. They need to be imposed because an agreement
is not mandatory and either broker or lender can unilaterally walk away. Expanding
the participation constraint of lender l dealing with broker b, I get:
∆Πlt(clbt|c∗−lbt) =
∑
i∈It
[ (
1− Fκ[κˆit(clbt|c∗−lbt)]
)∑
j∈Jlt
pib(i)t sb(i)jlt(clbt|c∗−lbt) Πbijt(clbt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected profits from dealing with broker b
+
(
Fκ[κˆim(clbt|c∗−lbt)]− Fκ[κˆit(0|c∗−lbt)]
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change in sales channel choices
∗
∗
∑
j∈Jlm
(
sijlt Π
D
ijt −
∑
b′ 6=b
pib′(i)t sb′(i)jlt(c
∗
−lbt) Π
b′
ijt(c
∗
−lbt)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gains/losses from other sales channels
]
≥ 0 .
(2.16)
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Equation (2.16) implies that, for the lender’s participation constraint to be non-
binding, commission payments need to be below a certain threshold, c¯lbt. Similarly,
I can expand the participation constraint of broker b dealing with lender l:
∆Wbt(clbt|c∗−lbt) =
∑
i∈It
pib(i)t
[(
1− Fκ[κˆim(clbt|c∗−lbt)]
)∑
j∈Jlt
sb(i)jlt(clbt|c∗−lbt)Wb(i)jt(clbt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profits from selling products from lender l
+
(
1− Fκ[κˆit(clbt|c∗−lbt)]
) ∑
k/∈Jlt
l′ 6=l
sb(i)kl′t(clbt|c∗−lbt) Wb(i)jt(cl′bt)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gains/losses from other product sales + changes in sales channel choices
−
︷ ︸︸ ︷(
1− Fκ[κˆit(0|c∗−lbt)]
) ∑
k/∈Jlt
l′ 6=l
sb(i)kl′t(0|c∗−lbt) Wb(i)jt(cl′bt)
]
≥ 0 .
(2.17)
Equation (2.17) shows that for the broker’s participation constraint to be non-
binding, commission payments need to be above a certain threshold, c
¯lbt
. Therefore,
for a broker and a lender to begin negotiations, the maximum commission a lender
is willing to pay must be higher than the minimum commission a broker is willing
to accept, that is, c¯lbt > c
¯lbt
. A lender’s decision to reach an agreement with a
broker is affected by downstream competition between brokerage services and the
lender’s in-house distribution channels (e.g., branches). A lender may decide to
exclude brokers operating in areas where it has an extensive branch network and
his outside option (i.e., direct sales) is much higher. On the other hand, a broker
may decide to exclude a lender from her network if the profits she gets from selling
other products is sufficiently larger. The intuition is that when jointly agreeing on a
mortgage with households, brokers need to split the surplus as given by equation 2.3.
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When distortion parameter θb is very low (e.g., the broker has limited bargaining
power), the household’s utility dominates the broker’s utility, and mortgage choices
for the pair are driven by households’ preferences. However, if brokers refrain from
including low-commission lenders in their networks, households’ will be forced to
choose among choice sets that are beneficial for brokers. The downside is that
households will anticipate the more restricted network and may decide to switch to
direct sales instead. The latter effect may be small for some lenders, causing brokers
to exclude them from their network if their commission is not sufficiently high.
Given each pair’s maximization problem, three outcomes are possible in terms
of agreement and optimal commission. First, if c¯lbt < c
¯lbt
, no agreement is reached
and the broker is not allowed to originate mortgages with that lender. Second, if, on
the other hand, c¯lbt ≥ c
¯lbt
and both participation constraints are not binding, each
pair chooses an optimal commission rate, c∗lbt, such that the first derivatives with
respect to commission payments are equal to zero, ∂log (NP lbt ) / ∂clbt = 0. Finally,
if at least one of the participation constraints is binding, the optimal commission is
either c¯lbt or c
¯lbt
.
2.3 Estimation and Identification
2.3.1 Demand
Household Preference Parameters
I assume demand taste shocks, εijlm and b(i)jlm, in the indirect utilities are identi-
cally and independently distributed across households, products, and lenders with a
type I extreme value distribution. Conditional on going through the direct channel,
the probability of household i choosing product j from lender l in market t is:
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sijlt ≡ Pr ( jl chosen | Cit) =
exp
(
V¯ijlt
)
∑
ks∈Cit exp
(
V¯ikst
) , (2.18)
where V¯ijlt is household indirect utility in equation 2.1 excluding the error term εijlt.
If household i hires broker b, the probability of choosing product j from lender l in
market t is:
sb(i)jlt ≡ Pr ( jl chosen | Cb(i)t) =
exp
(
V¯b(i)jlt
)
∑
ks∈Cb(i)t exp
(
V¯b(i)kst
) , (2.19)
where V¯b(i)jlt is broker-household indirect utility as defined in equation 2.3 without
the error term b(i)jlt. Given these choice probabilities, the log-likelihood for direct
and intermediated channels is:
ln (Li|ηi, δGjlt, δblt) =
∑
jl∈Ci
1ijlt
(
1
D
i ln(sijlt) +
∑
b∈Bt
1
b
i ln(sb(i)jlt)
)
, (2.20)
where ηi is a vector of all demand parameters, 1ijlt is a dummy equal to one if
household i buys product j from lender l in market t, 1Di is a dummy equal to
one if household i chooses the direct channel, and 1bi is a dummy equal to one if
household i hires broker b. I include product-lender-market-group fixed effects, δGjlt,
to account for product mean utility in an income-region group (G), that is, the part
of utility obtained from product j from lender l in market t that is common across
all households i in group G. I also add broker-lender-market fixed effects, δlbt, to
control for broker-lender mean utility, that is, the part of the utility obtained from
originating a product with lender l that is common across all households going to
broker b in market t.
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Identification.− One of the limitations of having transaction data is that house-
holds’ choice sets and lenders’ affordability criteria are unobserved. To identify
preference parameters, I create a household-specific counterfactual choice set de-
pending on their observable characteristics. First, I divide households into groups
based on geographical regions and year-quarter. I assume households in each group
can access all products sold in that region during that quarter, but not those sold in
other regions or other quarters. The geographical restriction affects mostly building
societies and smaller banks because they often have limited coverage. The time
restriction is needed to account for the entry and exit of products. Next, I consider
all households that purchased a given product and select those with the lowest credit
score, the highest loan-to-income ratio, and the highest age. I carry out this process
for every product. I then assume a household will not qualify for that product if (1)
it has a credit score lower than the cut-off value, (2) a loan-to-income ratio larger
than the cut-off value, or (3) is older than the cut-off value. The rationale for these
restrictions is based on lenders’ most common set of affordability criteria, which
rely on credit scores, loan-to-income, and age. Finally, for the intermediated sales
channel, I further restrict the choice set of the household-broker pair to products
sold by lenders with whom the broker has reached an agreement in the bargaining
stage.
After constructing a counterfactual choice set for each household, I proceed
to estimate demand parameters in the log-likelihood described in equation 2.20.
To identify household preferences over product characteristics (α, β), I use a two-
step instrumental variables approach to explicitly account for possible correlations
between interest rates (rjlt) and unobservable product characteristics (ξjlt). I use a
similar two-step approach to identify broker preferences over commission payments
and broker downstream market power (θb). This approach allows me to account for
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correlations between commissions (clbt) and unobservable broker-lender relationships
varying over time (ζblt). In a first step, I maximize the log-likelihood and recover
estimates for household preferences over branches (λ), broker preferences over prod-
uct characteristics other than commissions (γ2), product-lender-market-group fixed
effects (δGjlt), and broker-lender-market fixed effects (δlbt). I can separately identify
broker and household preferences as long as household-preference parameters for
product characteristics remain constant across sales channels. I can identify the
coefficient on bank branches as long as households value nearby branches only when
originating their mortgage directly through lenders. That is, for households going
through brokers, branches do not play a role.
In a second step, I regress the estimated product-lender-market fixed effects (δˆGjlt)
on interest rates and product characteristics:
δˆGjlt = [ α
G rjlt + ψ
G
1 High LTV + ψ
G
2 Two-Y ear F ixed ]× 1[i = Income-Region G]
+ Lender FE + Market FE + εijlt ,
(2.21)
where High LTV is a dummy equal to one if LTV is 85% or higher. Because
interest rates are potentially correlated with unobservable product characteristics
included in the error term, I use an instrumental variable approach in order to get
consistent estimates of demand parameters αG, ψG1 , and ψ
G
2 . In particular, I use
two cost shifters as instruments for the interest rate. I use risk weights associated
with capital requirements, which vary across time, lender, and loan-to-value bands.
I also use the rate for euro interest rate swaps for two, three, and five years. Swap
rates vary across time and type, and are a hedging instrument lenders use when
selling mortgages with fixed periods of two, three, and five years, respectively. Both
instruments allow me to exploit variation across markets, lenders and products. For
identification, I am assuming these instruments are uncorrelated with unobserved
product characteristics once I control for lender and market fixed effects.
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Moreover, I regress the estimated broker-lender-market fixed effects (δˆlbm) on
commissions and broker dummies:
δˆlbt =
∑
b
1[i = Broker b]
( θb
1− θb γ1 clbt
)
+ µbt + φlt + νbl + εlbt , (2.22)
where 1[i = Broker b] is a dummy equal to one for broker b. I normalize γ1 to one,
and absorb a rich set of fixed effects captured by µbt, φlt, and νbl. As a robustness
check and in order to control for possible correlations between the broker-lender-
market commissions and unobservable (to the econometrician) broker-lender-market
relationships that might affect brokers’ choices, I use supply-shifters instrumental
variables. I use as cost shifters for lenders and brokers the business rates (taxes) in
counties where the lender has its headquarters and the broker has its principal place
of business. This instrument exploits variation across markets, lenders, and brokers.
For identification, I assume these instruments are uncorrelated with unobserved
time-varying broker and lender characteristics once I control for lender, broker, and
market fixed effects.
Household Search Cost Distribution
I assign households to groups, G, based on their income quartile q, region g, and
market t. I assume a household i in group G knows the average ex-ante expected
maximum utility that households in the same group get from each sales channel.5
These ex-ante expected utilities can be computed using choice probabilities as given
5Recent consumer surveys at the Financial Conduct Authority have shown that 67% of
borrowers only consulted one broker when originating their mortgage. In another survey for UK
financial products, Finney and Kempson (2008) find most consumers only consulted at most one
source of information before making a purchase. Chater et al. (2010) reach a similar conclusion after
studying several European countries. Moreover, the FCA’s Financial Lives Survey 2017 indicates
23% of borrowers chose their broker because a real estate agent recommended it and 29% because
it was recommended by a friend or relative. This indicates that this referral is influential for some
consumers. Given households’ limited search for a broker and the importance of referrals, the
assumption that households only know the average utility similar households got when choosing
the brokerage channel seems reasonable.
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by equation 2.2 for both direct and intermediated sales. Let κˆG be the search cost
that makes household i in group G indifferent between both sales channels. The
payoffs from both channels are defined by:
Direct Channel =
(
IG∑
i∈G
E
[
max
jl
Vijlt (η) |Direct
])− κG
Broker Channel =
∑
b∈G
pib(G)t
IG∑
i∈G
(
E
[
max
jl
Vb(i)jlt (η) | b
]− αGfGbt) ,
(2.23)
where η is a vector of all preferences parameters estimated in the mortgage choice
problem; E
[
maxjl Vijlt (η) |Direct
]
and E
[
maxjl Vb(i)jlt (η) | b
]
are the ex-ante
expected household utilities of household i in IG going directly to the lender and
hiring broker b, respectively; pib(G)t is the probability that a household in group G
is matched to broker b; and fGbt is the broker fee paid by households in group G
when hiring broker b. I multiply the fee by the price coefficient, αG, in equation
2.21 to transform money into utils and make the fee comparable to the expected
utilities. This indifference condition in equation 2.23 implies that, if household i in
group G has a search-cost draw κi that is greater than κˆG, it will choose to hire a
broker. Similarly, if it has a search-cost draw κi smaller than κˆG, it will opt for the
direct sales channel and search for a mortgage across lenders’ in-house distribution
channels.
To estimate the mean and standard deviation of the search cost distribution
across subgroups, I use equation 2.23 and the preference parameters estimated in
the previous subsection. First, it is necessary to compute for each household the
average expected ex-ante utility that it will receive from each sales channel. For the
direct channel, following Small and Rosen (1981), household i will get an ex-ante
expected maximum utility equal to:
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E
[
max
jl
Vijlt (ηˆ) |Direct
]
= ln
[ ∑
ks∈Jit
exp (Vijlt (ηˆ, Direct))
]
, (2.24)
where ηˆ is the vector of demand-preference parameters estimated in the previous
subsection.
For broker sales, each broker-household pair maximizes the joint utility as defined
by equation 2.3. Therefore, I need to split the ex-ante expected maximum utility
of the pair into that of the broker and that of the household. To do so, I first
simulate draws from the distribution of the household’s error term for each product
assuming a type I extreme value distribution. For each draw, I compute the utility
of the broker-household pair for each product in the pair’s choice set and select the
product that gives the pair the highest utility. I then compute the household’s utility
for that choice. Finally, I take the average of the maximum household utilities across
draws, which will give me a numerical approximation of the household’s expected
ex-ante utility from that broker.
After computing all ex-ante expected maximum utilities for all channels and all
income-region groups, I can rewrite equation 2.23 as:
UˆDirectG − κˆG = UˆBrokerG , (2.25)
where UˆDirectG is the estimated expected maximum indirect utility of going direct,
and UˆBrokerG is estimated average expected net maximum indirect utility of choosing
the broker channel (after subtracting broker fees and multiplying by the probability
of being paired with that particular broker). The probability of household i choosing
the direct channel will depend on whether its search cost κi is smaller than κˆi:
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PDirecti = Prob ( κi < κˆG) =
∫
1(κi < κˆG) f(κ)dκ . (2.26)
Likewise, the probability that household i will choose the broker channel is:
PBrokeri = Prob ( κi > κˆG) =
∫
1(κi > κˆG) f(κ)dκ . (2.27)
I assume that search costs κ follow a normal distribution with mean µ and standard
deviation σ. Therefore, the log-likelihood function is:
Ln [L(µ, σ2; yi, κˆG)] =
∑
i
ln
([
F (κˆG | µ, σ2)
]yi[
1− F (κˆG | µ, σ2)
]1−yi)
, (2.28)
where F (.) is the cdf of κ, and yi is a dummy variable equal to one if the household
chose to go directly to the lender, and zero if it hired a broker. The value κˆi is
determined by equation 2.25.
Identification.− Identification of the search cost distribution parameters, µ and σ,
comes from variation in consumer choices and their expected utilities.
2.3.2 Supply
Lender Marginal Costs
The estimation of lenders’ marginal costs is based on the optimal pricing formula
derived in Section 2.2.3. Using the estimated preference parameters and cut-off
search costs, I can back out from equation 2.10 the average effective marginal
costs (AMCjt), which are a weighted average of the marginal costs from direct and
intermediated sales. I then assume that marginal costs from intermediated sales are
a function of product characteristics, whereas marginal costs from direct sales are the
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same as those of intermediated sales plus a premium. I regress the estimated average
marginal costs on product characteristics (weighted) and normalized commission
rates. I obtain a two-step estimator of the cost parameters at the product level with
the following linear specification:
AMCjt = ϕ1Xjt ρ
D
jt + ϕ2Xjt
B∑
b=1
pibtρ
b
jt + ϕ3
B∑
b=1
clb
tj
pibtρ
b
jt + τt + εjt , (2.29)
where AMCjt is the average marginal costs; Xjt are the same product characteristics
that affect borrower demand (loan-to-value band,initial period and lender); ρDjt and
ρBjt are weights defined in equations 2.11 and 2.12 respectively; clb are commission
payments; tj is the initial period; τt are market fixed effects; and εjt is a structural
error capturing unobservable variables that might affect average marginal costs (e.g.,
screening, advertising). This two-step estimation allows be to differentiate between
the marginal costs of direct and intermediated sales.
Identification.− I recover effective average marginal costs by inverting lenders’
optimal first-order conditions. Then, to separately identify direct and intermediated
marginal costs, I exploit variation across product choice probabilities conditional
on sales channels and changes in household choices of direct versus intermediated
channels. I also require that, for intermediated sales, the lender has to pay an
additional commission to brokers. Finally, to address any concern about endogeneity
in ρDjt and ρ
b
jt due to omitted variable bias, I use product characteristics and ρ values
of other lenders as an instrument for a lender’s own product characteristics and ρ
values.
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Broker-Lender Bargaining Parameters
The bargaining parameters depend on the protocol of the bargaining game and the
gains from trade of both lenders and brokers, as defined in section 2.2.3. Given
estimates for demand preferences, household search costs, and marginal costs, I can
compute both agreement and disagreement payoffs as described in the model for all
broker-lender pairs for which I observe an agreement in equilibrium. I choose the
values of βbl that minimize the distance between observed equilibrium commissions
and the estimated optimal commissions from the model, as determined by the first-
order conditions in the bargaining game.
Identification.− For each broker-lender pair, I invert the first-order conditions in
each pair’s bargaining problem. At this stage, the only unknowns are the bargain-
ing parameters. To identify them separately from the outside options, I exploit
geographical and time variation in lenders’ branch networks. These sources of
variation will affect lenders’ and brokers’ outside options, but not their bargaining
parameters. Moreover, I use the timing of negotiations. Demand realizations and
changes in branch networks happen more frequently than commission renegotiations.
This provides an additional source of variation to identify bargaining parameters
separately from changes in outside options. Finally, I also use cross-sectional varia-
tion on commission payments across lenders and brokers, as well as time variation
(commissions are renegotiated at least once during my sample period).
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2.4 Estimation Results
2.4.1 Demand Parameters: Preferences and Search Costs
For estimating the demand parameters described in subsection 2.3.1, I use a 25%
random sample as a training sample, and then use the remaining 75% of the data
for cross-validation. Panel A in Table 2.1 reports the estimated demand parameters
of the households’ mortgage choice problem for the 25% random sample.
The average point estimate of the coefficient on interest rates across all income-
region groups is significant and equal to -0.91, implying borrowers dislike more
expensive mortgages. The corresponding average own-product demand elasticity
is equal to 3.34, and the cross-product demand elasticity equals 0.02. That is,
on average, a 1% increase in the interest rate decreases the market share of the
mortgage by 3%, whereas the shares of other mortgages increase by 0.02%. I also
find that first-time-buyers value more mortgages with higher leverage (ψ1) and longer
initial fixed periods (ψ2). This type of borrower is often credit constrained, and a
higher loan-to-value allows for lower down-payments. Longer fixed periods minimize
switching costs involved in refinancing, as well as interest rate risk. Borrowers also
value the fraction of branches in nearby postcodes when purchasing the mortgage
directly from lenders. This effect disappears when borrowers originate the mortgage
through a broker.
Panel A in Table 2.1 also presents estimates for brokers’ distortions to households’
choices (brokers’ downstream market power). The average distortion is equal to
0.37, as captured by parameter θ. Figure 2-2 shows the distribution of θ across
broker companies, with values ranging between 0.28 and 0.45. Although brokers
are heterogeneous in their influence on borrowers, I can reject the null hypothesis
of benevolent brokers (θ equal to zero) at a 5% significance level for all broker
companies. In addition, brokers seem to have a preference for products with higher
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Table 2.1: Demand Estimates
PANEL A: Mortgage Choice Parameters
Interest Rate
Borrower (α)
High LTV
Borrower (ψ1)
2-Year Fixed
Borrower (ψ2)
Branches
Direct (λ)
Commission
Broker (θ¯)
High LTV
Broker (γ¯
21
)
2-Year Fixed
Broker (γ¯
22
)
Estimate -0.91 0.45 -0.21 0.33 0.37 0.14 0.27
SE 0.39 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.02 0.08
N Likelihood 7,493,244 7,493,244 7,493,244 7,493,244 7,493,244 7,493,244 7,493,244
N Borrowers 91,137 91,137 91,137 91,137 91,137 91,137 91,137
N 2nd Stage 5,208 5,208 5,208 - 483 - -
Lender FE Yes Yes Yes - Yes - -
Market FE Yes Yes Yes - Yes - -
Broker FE - - - - Yes - -
F-stat 102 102 102 - 26 - -
PANEL B: Sales Channel Choice Parameters
All Other Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Borrowers London Regions Income Income Income Income
SEARCH COSTS
Mean (µ) 3.3 2.9 4.1 3.1 3.3 3.9 5.0
Stand. Dev. (σ) 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.2
Note: Panel A shows the structural demand estimates of the logit model for demand for mortgage
products. The model is estimated for a 25% random sample. Standard errors are computed by
bootstrapping. The F-stat is the F statistics for the excluded instrument in the second stage
instrumental variable regressions for both product-market and broker-lender-market estimated
fixed effects. N likelihood is the total number of observations in the first stage (borrower-product
pairs). N second stage is the number of observations in the second stages. N borrowers is the total
number of borrowers in the 25% random sample. Panel B presents the estimates for the search
cost distributions. I use the entire sample for this part of the estimation.
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Figure 2-2: Broker Market Power Estimates
Note: The graph shows estimates of distortion parameter θb for the largest 20 broker companies in
the market and two categories of small and medium brokers. These parameters are obtained after
regressing the estimated broker-lender-market fixed effects on commissions interacted with broker
dummies. I also control for market, broker and lender fixed effects. To account for endogeneity
concerns, I use supply-side, cost shifters as instrumental variable for commissions. Standard errors
are computed by block-bootstrapping.
leverage (γ¯21) and shorter initial fixed periods (γ¯22). This preference is not surprising
given the financial incentives brokers face. As already described in section 1.3,
brokers get fees and commission payments every time households remortgage. Thus,
making this event happen as often as possible is in their best interest. Considering
that the commission payment is a percentage of the loan amount, brokers can nudge
households towards higher loan-to-value products. Results also show evidence of
lender geographical market power. The estimate for household preferences for bank
branches (λ) is positive and significant. Moreover, it is 30% of the size of the
average estimate for interest rates, implying households going directly to lenders
73
have a strong preference for nearby branches.
In Appendix B I discuss the fit of the model. Figure B-1 compares the distribu-
tion of estimated and observed market shares for both training and cross-validation
samples. The model fits the out-of-sample data quite well, both in terms of mean
and variance. The fit is also good when accounting for product characteristics,
namely, lender, initial period, and loan-to-value band. Figure B-2 plots estimated
and observed market shares across these dimensions. The main limitation is that the
model over-predicts the share of shorter initial period mortgages and has a higher
variance for products with loan-to-value bands above 85%.
Panel B in Table 2.1 presents estimates for the mean and standard deviation
of borrowers’ search cost distributions across income-region groups, as described
in section 2.3.1. I use the entire sample to estimate these parameters. I find the
average search cost for all first-time-buyers is equal to 3.3, with a variance of 0.5.
Panel A in Figure B-3 shows how borrowers in London have a lower average search
cost than those in other regions in the UK. Similarly, Panel B in Figure B-3 shows
that average search costs increase with income, while the variance decreases.
2.4.2 Supply Parameters: Marginal Costs and Bargaining
The first column of Table 2.2 presents average estimates for marginal costs. The
average marginal cost is 1.82 percentage points. Small banks have higher average
marginal costs, resulting partly from higher capital requirements (Benetton, 2018).
Mortgages with longer initial deals and higher loan-to-values are also more expensive
on average. The second and third columns of Table 2.2 differentiate between average
marginal costs for direct and intermediated sales, with intermediated sales being, on
average, 7% less costly to originate than direct sales. Figure B-5 plots marginal cost
distributions for both origination channels, illustrating the lower mean and higher
variance of broker sales’ marginal costs.
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Table 2.2: Marginal Costs
Total
Direct
Sales
Intermediated
Sales
All 1.82 1.93 1.79
Lender Type
Big Six 1.80 1.95 1.71
Challengers 1.84 1.87 1.83
Small Banks 2.31 2.16 2.40
Building Societies 1.87 1.78 1.93
Initial Period
2-Years 1.73 1.75 1.73
3-Years 1.94 2.02 1.89
5-Years 1.98 2.10 1.84
LTV Band
LTV ≤ 80 1.60 1.79 1.50
LTV >80 2.03 2.04 2.03
Note: Marginal costs are expressed in percentage points and computed for direct and intermediated
sales. I report total average marginal costs taking into account direct and intermediated sales for
each product in each time period. I also report marginal costs by different product characteristics:
lender, initial period and loan-to-value band.
This differential in marginal costs across sales channels is higher for the Big
Six, for whom intermediated sales are 12% cheaper. Challenger banks face similar
marginal costs, regardless of sales channel, whereas both small banks and building
societies find it more costly to originate mortgages through intermediaries rather
than through in-house distribution channels. This heterogeneity can be partly
driven by the Big Six having intermediary-only online platforms that facilitate the
application process and take advantage of economies of scale, which can ultimately
reduce the cost of originations via brokers, for example, through quicker income
verification. Intermediated sales also have a lower marginal cost for low loan-to-
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Table 2.3: Mark-ups
Total
Direct
Sales
Intermediated
Sales
(Pre-Commission)
Intermediated
Sales
(Post-Commission)
All 22% 28% 32% 18%
Lender Type
Big Six 22% 26% 36% 20%
Challengers 19% 30% 33% 17%
Small Banks 13% 27% 20% 7%
Building Societies 24% 36% 31% 16%
Initial Period
2-Years 19% 29% 31% 15%
3-Years 24% 28% 34% 19%
5-Years 25% 27% 37% 23%
LTV Band
LTV ≤ 80 23% 26% 38% 21%
LTV >80 17% 20% 20% 16%
Note: Mark-ups are expressed as a percentage of the interest rate. I report average mark-ups for
all products and by different product characteristics: lender, initial period and loan-to-value band.
I also differentiate between direct and intermediated sales mark-up. For the latter, I consider
separately mark-ups before and after commission payments.
value products.
Given marginal costs, I compute average mark-ups and find average mark-up
is 22%, which is close to the range that other papers studying the UK mortgage
market have reported (see, e.g., Benetton, 2018). Table 2.3 shows the existing
variation in mark-ups across lender types and other product characteristics. Most
importantly, once I differentiate between mark-ups for direct and intermediated sales
(accounting for commission payments), intermediated sales are estimated to be 37%
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less profitable for lenders than their in-house direct sales. This finding holds for
all lenders and all product types, implying that brokers have some market power
when negotiating with lenders and are able to extract surplus from lenders given
borrowers’ preferences for the brokerage channel.
Finally, given demand and cost estimates, Table 2.4 reports my estimates for
bargaining parameters, as described in section 2.3.2. Higher values indicate rela-
tively more bargaining power for lenders. Bargaining parameters are heterogeneous
and range between 0.19 and 0.72. These values reject the hypothesis of take-it-or-
leave-it offers, because bargaining parameters are neither one, which would imply
lenders choose mutually agreeable commissions that make brokers’ participation
constraints binding, nor zero, which would imply brokers offer commissions that
make lenders’ participation constraints binding. I find that large brokers have a
50% lower bargaining power when facing the Big Six and building societies than
when negotiating with challengers and small banks. Small brokers, on the other
hand, are able to equally split the surplus when negotiating with all types of lenders.
Among lenders, the Big Six have a bargaining power of 0.72 when dealing with large
brokers, but that situation is reversed when negotiating with small brokers. The
same happens to building societies. Challengers, however, only have a bargaining
power of 0.28 when facing large brokers, but are able to extract 50% of the surplus
against small brokers. Similarly, small banks have a higher bargaining parameter in
negotiations with small brokers.
2.5 Counterfactual Scenarios
In this section, I use the estimates from the model to simulate two sets of counterfac-
tual scenarios. The first set of counterfactual policies restricts the channels through
which households can originate a mortgage. First, I consider a policy banning broker
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Table 2.4: Lender Bargaining Parameters
Large Brokers Small Brokers
Big Six 0.72 0.41
Challengers 0.28 0.40
Building Societies 0.61 0.47
Small Banks 0.19 0.31
Note: This table reports estimated bargaining parameters for lenders versus large and small broker
companies. Larger values of the bargaining parameters indicate relatively more bargaining power
for lenders.
services in this market. Next, I implement a ban on direct sales, that is, I make
brokers’ advice mandatory. In the second set of policy counterfactuals, I consider
equilibrium effects from restricting commission payments. from a complete ban to
different caps. In all simulations, I make assumptions consistent with a short-run
analysis. I assume lenders do not change their available products and that no entry
or exit occur in the market. Lenders also do not modify their branch network. I also
impose that preferences remain invariant and that lenders’ marginal costs are not
affected by the policy change. I recognize that some of the assumptions underlying
the results in the simulations are strong, but they are necessary to produce policy
counterfactuals in this setting.
2.5.1 Restrictions on Broker Services and Direct Sales
First, I simulate an equilibrium without any brokerage services. Column (1) in Table
2.5 reports estimates of a counterfactual in which households can only originate their
mortgages via lenders’ in-house distribution channels. In this scenario, competition
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decreases with the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index increasing by 35%. Prices go up by
almost 25%, and lender profits increase by 12% (even more for the large lenders).
Household search costs increase by more than 150%. Larger search costs and higher
prices result in consumer surplus decreasing by 51%. This large fall in consumer
welfare suggests that the positive roles of brokers (lower search costs and more
upstream competition) dominate the negative ones, and households are better off
having these intermediaries in the market despite their distorted incentives.
Next, I consider an equilibrium with mandatory brokers’ advices (i.e., without
any direct sales). Column (2) in Table 2.5 shows estimates of a counterfactual
scenario banning direct sales and making expert advice from brokers mandatory. In
this simulation, lenders with extensive branch networks lose their local market power
(due to household preferences for nearby branches). Competition increases with the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index falling by 27% and the share of the Big Six decreasing
by 17%. Moreover, marginal costs go down by 12%, because now all sales are done
via brokers (which are more efficient). However, brokers are able to extract most
of this gain in efficiency by increasing their commission rates by 42%. This change
is driven by a drastic fall in outside options for the Big Six. Overall, lender profits
decrease by 20% and prices increase by 9%. The net effect on consumer surplus is
a decrease of 6%.
To generate estimates in Column (2), I make two assumptions that might change
in the long-run and could affect the overall effect on sumer surplus. First, I assume
no entry in the broker market. Given the increase in broker revenues due to
higher commissions, it seems reasonable to expect some entry in this market. More
brokers would result in lower commissions for banks and, most likely, lower prices
for households. This effect will increase consumer surplus. The second assumption
is that broker fees to households remain constant. However, if brokers also increased
their fees to households, consumer surplus would decrease. The magnitude of this
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Table 2.5: Counterfactual Restrictions on Commission Payments
Ban on
Brokerage
%∆
Ban on
Direct Sales
%∆
Ban on
Commissions
%∆
Cap
at 0.4%
%∆
Fixed
at 0.4%
%∆
Fixed
at 0.7%
%∆
Market Structure
HHI 35% -27% 21% 5% -3% 12%
Share Big Six 19% -17% 12% 3% -2% 8%
Pass-Through
Prices 24% 9% 11% -5% -1% 8%
Marginal Cost 13% -12% 9% -1% -4% 5%
Lender Profits 12% -20% 7% -2% 0% 5%
Commission Rates -100% 42% -100% -35% -17% 49%
Demand
Share Direct 357% -100% 115% 30% -1% 14%
Search Costs 156% -100% 83% 13% -1% 19%
Consumer Surplus -51% -6% -26% 9% 2% -11%
Note: Column (1) reports estimates of restricting brokerage services, so that all mortgages are
originated through lenders’ in-house distribution channels. Column (2) presents estimates of
banning direct sales and making broker advice mandatory. Columns (3) and (4) show estimates
for policies imposing a ban and a cap on commissions equal to the median commission. Column
(5) sets all commissions equal to 0.4%, and Column (6) fixes commissions at 0.7%.
additional fall will depend on the level of competition among brokers, which I do
not model. Thus, Column (2) is a lower bound on the losses.
Overall, banning either broker sales or direct sales will decrease consumer welfare
in the short-run. These results suggest that consumers are better off with the
baseline model in which there is competition among brokers and branches.
2.5.2 Restrictions on Commission Rates
Reduced-form evidence in Section 1.3 suggests brokers react to supply-side incen-
tives. Estimates for brokers’ distortion parameters θb in Section 2.4 also reject the
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hypothesis of benevolent brokers, indicating brokers’ choices respond to commission
payments. To align households’ and brokers’ incentives, regulators have imposed
restrictions on upstream payments to intermediaries. To address the effects of such
policies, I use the estimated model to explore the equilibrium impact of changes in
commission rates.
First, I consider equilibrium effects of imposing a ban on commission payments
between brokers and lenders. In this counterfactual, I assume broker fees to house-
holds’ increase such that the average per-sale profit each broker company receives is
the same as in the estimated baseline model.6 In Appendix B, I run the same policy
counterfactual but make alternative assumptions on broker pass-through. I obtain
qualitatively similar results for different increases in broker downstream fees.
Column (3) in Table 2.5 shows results when implementing a ban on commissions
given the assumptions mentioned above. This policy proves to be detrimental for
consumers. Market concentration and prices go up, as well as marginal costs and
search costs. Consumer surplus falls by more than 25%, and profits for the Big Six
increase by more than 27%. To illustrate the mechanism that seems to dominate
in this equilibrium, consider a household with large search costs. In the baseline
model, this household chooses the brokerage channel. However, because broker fees
to households increase significantly in this counterfactual, this household now decides
to originate its mortgage via lenders’ in-house distribution channels. As shown in
the estimated model by the coefficient on nearby branches λ, lenders’ with extensive
branch networks are able to get a higher market share from households going direct.
When setting interest rates, the Big Six anticipate this increase in direct sales and
increase prices, resulting in lower consumer surplus. Given the relevance of branches
and other in-house distribution channels in the new equilibrium, challenger banks
6I need to make an assumption on broker pass-through since my model does not endogeneize
broker fees to households. Since most broker companies in the baseline charge zero fees, it would
be unrealistic not to change fees in the counterfactual. Broker companies need to make money,
and, if lenders no longer make payments, it seems reasonable to assume household fees will go up.
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Figure 2-3: Consumer Surplus and Maximum Commission Rates
Note: A ban on commissions is equivalent to imposing a cap equal to zero. No restrictions
on commissions is equivalent to imposing a (non-binding cap) equal to 0.9%. The y-axis plots
consumer surplus as defined in subsection 2.3.1.
are likely to invest in their own channels in the long-run. In addition, some broker
companies could be forced to exit the market given the decrease in their market share
as a result of higher household fees. I do not capture these long-run equilibrium
effects in my estimates.
An alternative policy to align households’ and brokers’ incentives is to impose
a cap on commission payments. I assume this cap to be equal to the average
commission in the baseline model (0.4% of the loan amount). This regulation allows
brokers to still get some revenue from lenders, and therefore broker fees to households
do not increase as much as in the case of a ban. This policy also has implications for
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the network of broker-lender pairs. For some pairs, their new optimal commission,
c∗lbt, as defined in Section 2.2.3, is below the cap, c
cap
t . For these cases, nothing
changes and the link still holds. For other pairs, the cap violates the broker’s
participation constraint and the link is broken. Finally, for some pairs, the cap
could be binding, and the link holds with an equilibrium commission equal to ccapt .
Column (4) in Table 2.5 reports estimates for a regulation imposing a cap. Direct
sales increase only by 30% and search costs only go up by 13% (both significantly
less than in the case of a ban). Prices fall by 5%, and the overall impact on consumer
surplus is positive, with an increase of almost 10%. These results are driven because,
despite brokers having narrower networks of lenders and household broker fees going
up, households that do hire brokers get, on average, a much better deal than in the
baseline model.
Figure 2-3 plots the relationship between consumer surplus and different levels
of caps on commissions. This non-monotonic relationship results from a trade-off
between broker market power and lender local market power. Households originating
their mortgages via brokers face broker market power in the sense that brokers can
extract surplus from them (positive values of θ). On the other hand, households
going directly to lenders prefer nearby branches. This preference gives lenders local
market power, which they can exploit when setting interest rates. A very restrictive
cap reduces broker market power at the expense of increasing lender market power.
In the case of a ban, the gains of reducing broker market power do not compensate
for the welfare loss of increasing lender market power.
The final set of policy counterfactuals considers cases in which, instead of capping
commission payments, the regulator fixes commissions to an homogeneous rate. This
policy will have the following equilibrium effects. First, a different set of broker-
lender links will break. As in the case of a cap, some agreements with higher
rates in the baseline will no longer be in place. Additionally, some links with lower
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rates in the baseline will also no longer hold. Therefore, broker networks will be
significantly narrower than in the baseline. This effect will reduce household payoffs
from going to brokers and will lead some households to shift to the direct channel
(decreasing lender competition and increasing prices). The second equilibrium effect
of this policy is that household and broker incentives are more aligned than in
the baseline. Household expected utility of going to the broker goes up and some
households will shift to the broker channel. However, it is important to highlight
that, even though heterogeneity of commissions across lenders no longer distorts
brokers’ advice, brokers still have their own incentives and these do not necessarily
matched those of the household. Theoretically, the overall effect of these policies is
ambiguous.
Columns (5) and (6) in Table 2.5 report estimates for regulations fixing com-
mission rates to 0.4% and 0.7%, respectively. Estimates in Column (5) have very
similar averages to the baseline with no restrictions. Estimates in Column (6) result
in a 11% lower consumer surplus, driven by a larger shift of households into the
direct channel. Both policies affect selection into brokers and, consequently, which
households are better and worse off because of the regulation. When commission
rates are fixed at 0.7%, broker networks are mostly composed by challenger banks.
Therefore, households whose payoffs are larger with these banks are more likely to
go to brokers. However, these households also have, on average, lower search costs.
In equilibrium, households with larger search costs but preferences for the Big Six
go direct, while households with lower search costs but preferences for products by
the challenger banks go to brokers. The Big Six are able to increase their prices and
overall consumer surplus decreases by 11%. In the case where commission rates are
set to 0.4%, the two equilibrium effects mentioned above counterbalance each other
and the overall impact on consumer surplus is almost analogous to the baseline.
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2.6 Conclusion
Regulations restricting upstream payments for expert advisors have been at the
center of academic and policy debate in the last decades. An ongoing effort seeks
to better understand the effectiveness of such policies and the supply and demand
channels through which they operate. This paper contributes to this debate by
focusing on the UK mortgage market, where brokers play a key role in improving
upstream competition among lenders and reducing household search costs. In this
market, restrictions on commission payments have a positive effect on consumer
surplus by aligning households’ and brokers’ incentives. However, they also have
a negative impact on consumer welfare by increasing downstream fees and making
more consumers go directly to lenders. The decrease in demand for expert services
increases the market power of lenders with extensive branch networks. As restric-
tions become more severe, the increase in prices due to less competition upstream
dominates the gains from reducing the agency problem between households and
brokers. Overall, whenever restricting financial relationships between intermediaries
and upstream firms, considering the supply-side equilibrium effects such policies will
unravel is vital.
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Chapter 3
Deposit Withdrawals
[Note: This is co-authored work with Nikos Artavanis, Daniel Paravisini, Amit Seru and Margarita
Tsoutsoura. All figures and tables are located at the end of the chapter.]
3.1 Introduction
The global financial crisis saw runs on several prominent banks and financial intermediaries. It
reopened fundamental old debates on the rationale of a banking system with “run prone” deposits
(e.g., Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) as well as on policies that provide stability in the wake of
uncertainty (e.g., Drechsler et al., 2018; Egan et al., 2017).1 Banking regulation that seeks to tackle
these issues relies on some assessment of motives driving depositor withdrawals during uncertain
and quiet times. Theoretical work has broadly put these depositor withdrawal motives into reasons
related to liquidity (idiosyncratic), solvency (fundamentals including policy risk) or expectations
about withdrawal behavior of other depositors (coordination). Remarkably, empirical work that
isolates and quantifies these motives has been very limited (e.g., Iyer and Puri, 2012). The main
obstacles towards this goal have been obtaining detailed high frequency deposit-level data and a
credible empirical design in an important setting. This paper aims to fill this important gap.
We develop a new approach to isolate and quantify the extent to which deposit withdrawals are
due to liquidity, exposure to policy risk, or expectations about how other depositors will behave.
We use daily micro-data on insured time-deposits from a large Greek bank over a long time period
1Several theories have also been proposed on advantages that such deposits provide to the
financial system during quiet and “sleepy” periods (e.g., Hanson et al., 2015).
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that spans quiet periods as well as events with large policy uncertainty. We use variation induced
by maturity expiration of time deposits around the large policy uncertainty events to filter deposit
withdrawals due to direct exposure to policy risk from those due to expectations about behavior
of other depositors. We quantify these effects in terms of elasticities with respect to foregone
returns and changes in short-run CDS prices. Doing so allows us to compare the magnitudes of
our effects with those found anecdotally in other prominent cases of bank runs (e.g., Northern
Rock in UK and Washington Mutual in US) and policy uncertainty (e.g., Italy in the spring and
summer of 2018). Much like the setting in Greece, our estimates explain a significant fraction of
total depositor withdrawals during these episodes.
Our setting uses daily deposit-level data with detailed contract characteristics on the entire
universe of time deposit accounts for retail customers of a large Greek bank. We focus on the
time period between 2014 and 2015. This period saw both quiet and uncertain times, as well
as withdrawals that in the aggregate drained away almost 30% of time deposits in the Greek
banking system. In Greece, 62% of all Greek bank deposits by households are time deposits, being
economically relevant for the stability of bank funding sources.2 This high prevalence of time
deposits is not unique to Greece. In Euro area country banks, close to 50% of domestic private
non-financial deposits are time deposits with a maturity over one year. 3 Moreover, time deposits
are useful from the research design point of view since these contracts have a fixed maturity and
“breaking” these deposits prematurely results in a penalty. Any such withdrawal allows us to
assess the magnitude of the cost of withdrawal in terms of foregone interest.
Using this setting we start by establishing new facts on depositor withdrawal behavior in
“quiet times”, when both the bank and sovereign credit default swaps are at their lowest. During
such periods there is no uncertainty about bank fundamentals. It is also unlikely that withdrawals
during these times are driven by insolvency concerns due to expectations of a large number of other
depositors withdrawing. Thus, early withdrawals during such periods allow us to study withdrawal
behavior motivated by depositors’ idiosyncratic liquidity needs. We find that, on average, about
0.04% of depositors withdraw time deposits early on a daily basis. This implies that 14.6% of time
deposits per year are withdrawn early due to liquidity reasons. The foregone annualized return
from quiet-time early withdrawals is on average 17% and can be as high as 65% for some borrowers.
2See Bank of Greece report on deposit markets, available at https://www.bankofgreece.gr/
Pages/en/Statistics/rates_markets/deposits.aspx
3See, for example, ECB report on Changes in Bank Financing Patterns, available at:
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/changesinbankfinancingpatterns201204en.
pdf?3afe7cf6dc78e23e1c8b5201d0dc51ae
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This is a period when total deposits in the banking sector (and our bank) were growing, and there
was no indication of distress in any price. The magnitudes in early withdrawals during this time
imply that depositors exhibit a high willingness to withdraw deposits for liquidity reasons.
Next, we use a novel empirical strategy to isolate depositor withdrawal motives due to changes
in their expectations about withdrawal behavior of other depositors (coordination motives). To
do so we exploit a large national “announcement event” in Greece as well as deposit heterogeneity
in maturity dates after this event. The surprise announcement was an unprecedented call on
December 8, 2014 for a Presidential election in Parliament in the following weeks. It marked the
beginning of a period of very high expected future policy uncertainty in Greece, including the
threat of Greece leaving the Euro zone and of the conversion of deposits from euros to a new Greek
currency. The impact of the increased risk on the financial system was large, with the price of the
6-month CDS on Greek sovereign bonds increasing by 136% and the stock market dropping by
12%. Importantly, any policy change could occur only if the Presidential elections failed, national
elections were called and there was a change in government at the end of January, 2015. That is,
in the weeks after the surprise announcement there was no risk of new policies being implemented.
The announcement event and associated institutional features provide us with a research design
to isolate withdrawals due to coordination motives. In particular, for depositors whose deposits
matured in the weeks following the surprise announcement, but before any change in government
(i.e., between December 8, 2014 and end of January 2015), there was no risk due to new policies.
Policies that might have altered fundamentals of Greece or the bank itself were not possible during
this maturity period. In addition, we show how the bank faced no liquidity or funding shortages
after the announcement, and there were no changes to its assets and liabilities. Therefore, these
depositors (“treatment group”) could wait until maturity without facing risks associated with
policy changes or changes in bank fundamentals. However, this treatment group did face the risk
that they would be unpaid if many other depositors withdrew during December and January in
anticipation of policy changes in the future. Depositors with maturities further into the future
(i.e., after the change in government) had motives to withdraw early in anticipation of policy
changes after the election.4 Thus, all else equal, the only reason for depositors in the treatment
group to change their withdrawal behavior during this time period is due to coordination motives.
Accordingly, our research design focuses on changes in withdrawal behavior of the treatment group
around the announcement event. To make all else equal, we implement a difference-in-difference
4Given the structure of the penalty for early withdrawals, depositors are better off withdrawing
as early as possible once they are certain they will have to “break” the contract.
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specification where we account for liquidity withdrawals using another set of similar depositors
with deposits of similar maturity (“control group”) around a quiet episode. Our estimates suggest
that coordination motives increase the probability of withdrawing early by almost 70% relative to
the baseline probability of withdrawing.
Next, we exploit the period around the national election of January 25, 2015 to quantify
the motives for withdrawal that are related to changes in fundamentals induced by policy changes.
After the election and with a new government in power, new policies could be implemented.5 Thus,
depositors whose deposits matured after the election faced additional risk since policy changes could
directly impact fundamentals of Greece and the bank. Under the assumption that coordination
motives for these depositors remain the same as those depositors whose deposits matured before
the election, we can isolate fundamentals related reasons for depositor withdrawals by comparing
depositors with maturity dates before and after the election. As in our previous exercise, we
account for liquidity withdrawals using a counterfactual set of depositors with similar maturities
during our quiet period. Our estimates suggest that withdrawal motives related to fundamentals
increase the probability of withdrawing early by almost 200% relative to the baseline.
Together, these magnitudes illustrate the importance of very different motives in explaining
depositor withdrawal behavior. For instance, over 25% of the overall increase in the probability
of early withdrawals is due to depositors withdrawing early because they anticipate that other
depositor withdrawals, possibly due to likely policy changes in the future, might impact solvency
of the bank. The short-run combined effect of coordination and fundamental related motives for
withdrawals around the events we study is quite large. During this period, the short-run CDS price
of the sovereign bond doubled. It also saw a quadruple increase in withdrawal probability relative
to the baseline quiet-time annual withdrawal rate of 14.6%. In other words, if the shock that led to
deposit withdrawals had remained constant, it would have depleted the time-deposits of the bank
in less than two years. Alternatively, the three motives when scaled to annual frequency, account
for 80% of aggregate deposit withdrawals from our Greek bank during the two months after the
first announcement event on December 8, 2014.
In auxiliary tests, when we exploit heterogeneity across depositors and contract characteristics,
we find that the magnitude of the cross-sectional variation in coordination motives is very small
relative to its absolute level. This is consistent with the notion that coordination motives for
5According to election polls, there was no uncertainty on the outcome of the election: there
would be a new government after January 25, 2015. There was uncertainty, however, on the policies
this new government will implement and whether it will keep its electoral promises.
89
withdrawals are difficult to predict ex-ante using observable characteristics of the borrower base.
We do find, however, a strong spatial autocorrelation in withdrawal behavior of depositors across
nearby branches in the Northern region of Greece after the announcement event on December 8,
2014. Before that event there is no evidence of depositor withdrawal behavior being correlated
across space. After the event, we observe clusters across branches in particular areas in the country,
which cannot be explained by observable depositor characteristics in terms of political views,
income and demographics. It is worth noting that despite the richness of our data, we are limited
in the power of these tests due to requirements on timing and maturity of deposits imposed by our
research design.
In the second part of the paper, we quantify the magnitude of withdrawal motives in terms
of forgone returns and changes in short-run CDS prices. We exploit the discontinuity in the cost
of early withdrawal around pre-scheduled accrued interest repayment dates. On these dates the
cost of withdrawal drops to zero. Thus, any early withdrawal around these dates allows us to back
out foregone returns of doing so. We estimate a cost-elasticity of withdrawing deposits early of
1.54 in quiet times. Expressed in monetary terms, a drop of e100 in the cost of withdrawing (i.e.,
0.26% of deposit amount) increases the baseline probability of idiosyncratic deposit withdrawals
by a third. Put another way, these estimates imply that an economically meaningful fraction of
depositors are willing to pay a high cost to withdraw insured deposits for liquidity or idiosyncratic
reasons.6 We use these estimates to calibrate the monetary cost of withdrawals due to coordination
and fundamental motives.
As noted earlier, around the announcement of elections, an increase of short-run CDS price
by around 125% was associated with a sharp increase in withdrawals due to coordination motives.
The magnitudes are equivalent to dropping the cost of withdrawing during quiet times by around
e300. Alternatively, if the bank wanted to prevent withdrawals due to coordination motives
after an increase in CDS prices by more than 100%, it would have to increase interest rates on
deposits by 0.8 percentage points. Similarly, an increase in the price of short-run CDS (about 30%)
after the elections due to risk about changes to policy dramatically increased withdrawals due to
fundamental motives. Put in terms of our calibration, these magnitudes are equivalent to dropping
the cost of withdrawing during quiet times by around e600. Alternatively, if the bank wanted to
prevent withdrawals due to fundamental motives after an increase in CDS prices by 30%, it would
6It is worth noting that the estimates, obtained for time deposits, represent a lower bound on
the volatility of demand deposits due to idiosyncratic reasons, since demand deposits do not face
a penalty for early withdrawal and are most likely chosen by depositors who are more exposed to
liquidity shocks.
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have to increase interest rates on deposits by 1.6 percentage points over the next month before
maturity (equivalent to a 21% annual return).
It is worth noting that the short-run deposit withdrawal elasticities we estimate are very
likely a lower bound on the withdrawal elasticity over a longer horizon. The coordination and
fundamental motives for withdrawing plausibly increase as bank deposits shrink. This is certainly
consistent with the new Greek government imposing a withdrawal limit of e60 per day as deposits
fled the Greek banks, less than six months after the election result. Nevertheless, to gauge external
relevance of our estimates as well as to assess their plausibility, we consider how depositor behavior
predicted by our estimates compares to actual depositor behavior in the rest of Greece and in other
episodes of abnormal deposit withdrawals. Our results predict that, after the increase in CDS prices
following December 8, 2014, we should observe 8% of time depositors withdrawing their deposits.7
Another recent episode involving policy uncertainty and a progressive leakage of depositors took
place in Italy in May 2018. Over a two-week political crisis, the CDS price on Italian sovereign
bonds increased by 177%. During this period, 31.6% of time deposits with maturities shorter than
two years left the Italian banking system. According to our estimates, this increase in the CDS
should have resulted in a 10.5% decrease in time deposits. This is a substantial proportion since
our estimates only account for time deposits with maturities shorter than one year. We find that
we can similarly explain a significant fraction of total depositor withdrawals in the cases of bank
runs on Washington Mutual in the US and Northern Rock in UK.
Our paper adds to recent work using micro-data to characterize the depositor behavior. Prior
work has had to rely on an ex ante classification by the researcher of whether depositor behavior
was a run or driven by fundamentals (Iyer and Puri, 2012; Iyer et al., 2016). Work on coordination
motives has also relied on differential effect of an aggregate shock across institutions (Schmidt et al.,
2016). In contrast, our approach relies on exogenous variation in the differential costs of running
across depositors in the same institution. Doing so occurs naturally in the context of time-deposits
and allows the data to tell whether depositor behavior is triggered by coordination or fundamental
motives. Since the cost of running in time deposits is observable by the researcher, our approach
has the added advantage that allows a quantitative evaluation of the cost of withdrawing deposits.
In general, these estimates are hard to obtain without making strong structural assumptions (Dick,
2008, Egan et al., 2017). We contribute to this work by providing a novel approach that allows
us to decompose and quantify the liquidity, coordination and fundamental motivations of deposit
7Recall that during the two months after this date, our bank lost 10% of its total time deposits
and aggregate time deposits in the Greek banking system decreased by almost 8%.
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withdrawals.Our estimates can help determine how much should the bank increase interest rates
on deposits to keep depositors from withdrawing after changes in CDS prices. In fact, banks often
use this mechanism to retain depositors following a change in fundamentals (Acharya and Mora,
2015). Moreover, banks also increase deposit rates when depositor perception of the bank worsens,
even when it is not driven exclusively by fundamentals (Chavaz and Slutzky, 2018).
Our work is related to a large literature on bank runs. Theoretical literature discusses information-
based runs (see, e.g., Bryant, 1980, Diamond and Dybvig, 1983, Postlewaite and Vives, 1987,
Rochet and Vives, 2004, and Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005) and runs based on coordination
problems (see, e.g., Jacklin and Bhattacharya, 1988, Chari and Jagannathan, 1988, Calomiris
and Kahn, 1991, Chen, 1999, and Diamond and Rajan, 2001). Runs on repo and asset-backed
commercial paper (ABCP) for shadow banks have also been documented (see, e.g., Gorton and
Metrick, 2012, Acharya et al., 2013, Covitz et al., 2013, and Schroth et al., 2014).
Our paper also contributes to the empirical literature on economic and political uncertainty.
Recent empirical papers on the effects of uncertainty on firm incentives include Bloom et al. (2007),
Bloom, 2009, Bachmann et al. (2013), and Bloom et al. (2018), with a review in Bloom (2014).
There is also a strand of work measuring policy uncertainty (see, e.g., Jurado et al., 2015, Baker
et al., 2016).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data and the institutional
setting. Section 3.3 introduces aggregate policy uncertainty and analyzes depositors’ withdrawal
behavior when exposed to changes in expectations of other depositors’ behavior and exposure
to policy risk. Section 3.4 considers heterogeneity in our results across depositor and account
characteristics, and geographical and political dimensions. Section 3.5 quantifies the effects and
compares them to other episodes. Finally, Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Institutional Setting, Data and Descriptive
Statistics
3.2.1 Data
Our dataset consists of time deposit accounts for the universe of retail customers of a large Greek
bank. Standard contracts for time deposits are characterized by a fixed maturity period over which
depositors cannot withdraw funds without incurring a monetary penalty. Time deposit contracts
92
in our bank do not allow for the possibility of partial withdrawals. Each day, a time depositor faces
two choices: do nothing (and keep waiting until maturity) or withdraw the entire deposit amount
before maturity. In case of an early withdrawal, depositors lose all accrued interests since the last
interest payment. This foregone income is deposit-specific and varies over time, being a function
of interest rates, account amounts and the number of days left to maturity.
We observe each time deposit at a daily level from January 1, 2014, to March 31, 2015. Each
observation has information on account features (interest rate, currency, origination and maturity
dates) and depositor characteristics (gender, age, relationship with the bank, income, education).
There are additional details on the branch that originated each deposit (postcode, branch ID).
Table 3.1 shows summary statistics describing the key variables in our data. The average deposit
amount is e27,281 and the average interest rate is almost 2%. Time deposits in our sample have
an average maturity of almost six months, with the most popular contracts having a maturity
length of one, three, six and twelve months. 77% of accounts are denominated in euros.
Time depositors have an average age of 65 years and are 45% female.8 The average income of
time depositors (as declared in their tax return) is $25,363, while the average income in Greece in
2013 was $8,879 for individuals and $17,270 for households (ELSTAT). Thus, time depositors tend
to be among the high earners. Almost one-third of time depositors have at least another credit
product with the bank, mainly a mortgage, a consumer loan or a credit card. Depositors tend to
hold their time deposits for over two years, renewing them an average of five times. Finally, our
bank operates at a national level and has an extensive branch network, which is heterogeneous in
size and density across regions.
3.2.2 Depositor Withdrawal Patterns
Idiosyncratic Withdrawal during Quiet Times
Despite the monetary cost associated with early withdrawal, we observe that within a year 15% of
time depositors (0.04% a day) withdraw their deposit amounts at least five days before maturity.9
8We do not observe whether the account has multiple depositors. All depositor characteristics
in our data correspond to those of the main account holder. Given the average age of depositors
and the large presence of our bank in rural areas, it seems likely that, when there is a couple
owning the time deposit, the main holder is male.
9This gap of at least five days is because whenever a time deposit matures on a day that is
weekend or holiday, the withdrawal is recorded on the earliest business day close to the maturity
day.
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The foregone annualized return from these early withdrawals is on average 17% and can be as
high as 65% for withdrawals that occur close to the maturity date. The high incidence of early
withdrawals and depositors’ high willingness to pay to break time deposits are new stylized facts to
both academics and regulators. In fact, under Basel III it is common to exclude term deposits from
cash outflow calculations for Liquidity Coverage Ratios because it is presumed that depositors are
unwilling to pay the associated penalty to withdraw. These stylized facts suggest that deposits are
less slow-moving than commonly assumed.
Withdrawal behavior is also heterogeneous across depositors and account characteristics. Fig-
ure 3-1 plots 1) the distribution of time deposits in our sample across subgroups based on deposit
and depositor characteristics, and 2) the fraction of early withdrawals over the same subgroups.
Early withdrawals are more common in accounts with lower interest rates and longer maturity
length. Depositors with more products with the bank (for example, mortgages, loans and credit
cards) are also more likely to withdraw. We do not find a differential effect in withdrawal behavior
across education and age groups. Female and male depositors also have the same fraction of early
withdrawals. We also do not observe patterns across origination and maturity dates. Panels A
and B in Figure 3-2 plot the total number of time deposits originated in a given week and those
maturing during the same period. Depositor behavior when choosing when to open a time deposit
and when this deposit matures does not seem to be strategic, on average.
Withdrawal Around Time Deposit Maturity Expiration
The data exhibits some patterns in withdrawal behavior of depositors over the duration of their
contracts. Figure 3-3 shows the fraction of early withdrawals as a function of days to maturity
for the most common maturity lengths: six and twelve months. We observe that the relationship
between early withdrawals and time to maturity has an inverted-U shape. Depositors are less likely
to withdraw at the beginning and end of their maturity period.
The non-monotonic withdrawal behavior over the life of the deposit reflects the benefits and
costs of liquidity motivated deposit withdrawal desicions. A depositor will make a time deposit
if she does not foresee having a need for the cash in the very short run, which explains why
withdrawals are very unfrequent early in the life of a deposit. The probability of unexpected
liquidity needs increases over time, consistent with the withdrawal probability increasing over the
initial life of the deposit.
The opportunity cost of withdrawing a time deposit, on the other hand, increases over time
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as the maturity date approaches. Withdrawing a deposit early is equivalent to taking a loan for
the remaining maturity of the deposit, at a monetary cost equal to the promised interest. Suppose
a depositor makes a one-year term deposit of e100 at a 3% rate. If she holds the deposit until
maturity, she receives e103. Withdrawing the deposit two weeks before maturity is equivalent
to paying e3 of interest to borrow e100 for two weeks, or borrowing at an annualized rate that
exceeds 110%. If the depositor withdraws one week before maturity, the implied interest rate of
the loan exceeds 350%. It is thus expected that the probability of early withdrawals drops as the
deposit approaches maturity.
Withdrawals within weeks of the maturity date of the deposit can only be rationalized if
depositors are extremely impatient. Interest rates exceeding 100% rates are not uncommon in
Payday or other high-cost loans that serve liquidity constrained borrowers. The difference is that
while typical high-cost loans are for small amounts, below e1,000, the average time deposit in
our sample exceeds e50,000. This implies that the economic cost of early withdrawals can be
substantial.
Withdrawal Around Biannual Payments
If a time depositor decides to withdraw her deposit amount before maturity, she will lose all
accrued interests between the last interest payment and the time of withdrawal. Our bank
calculates accrued interests using a non-linear formula that depends positively on interest rates,
Euribor rates and account amounts, and negatively on days left to maturity. Interest payments
are heterogeneous across deposit accounts (depend on account characteristics) and vary over time
(depend on origination date and maturity length). Accrued interests for time deposits are paid
at maturity, except for two dates: January 1 and July 1. On these days, all accounts receive
their accrued interests until that moment. Suppose depositor makes a one-year time deposit in
March 1 on year T and holds it to maturity until February 28 on year T+1. During the length
of her contract the depositor will get three interest payments. The first will consist of all accrued
interests between March and June and will be paid on July 1. The second payment, on January 1,
will account for all accrued interest between July and December. Finally, at maturity on February
28 on year T+1, the depositor will receive accrued interests for January and February plus the
principal.
Depositors may behave strategically when deciding whether to withdraw their deposits around
interest payments on January 1 and July 1. To illustrate depositors’ incentives around these dates,
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let us consider a time deposit that has accumulated e100 as accrued interests by June 30. If
the depositor decides to withdraw on that day, then she would lose e100. If, on the other hand,
she waits one more day, then she will receive e100 on July 1 as her interest payment. She could
then withdraw her entire deposit amount without forgoing any accrued interest. This exogenous
reset to zero of accrued interests (effectively a fall in the price of early withdrawal) results in a
discontinuity in early withdrawals around June 30 and July 1. Panel A in Figure 3-4 illustrates
this strategic behavior by plotting accrued interests and the fraction of withdrawals in the weeks
before and after interest payments on July 1, 2014. We observe that a fall of e500 in the cost of
early withdrawal is followed by a 40% increase in early withdrawals. Panel B in Figure 3-4 shows
the drop in the forgone rate of return. Average forgone returns fall from 50% to zero on July 1,
incentivizing depositors to strategically withhold early withdrawals until after accrued interests are
paid.
3.2.3 Institutional Setting and Political Events
We analyze withdrawal behavior of time depositors in the weeks leading to the election of Alexis
Tsipras, leader of the anti-austerity left-wing party Syriza, on January 25, 2015 (hereafter t1).
These weeks represent a period of political turmoil and policy uncertainty in Greece. Electoral
campaign programs of all major parties revolved around the bailout conditions imposed on Greece
by the European Union and the International Monetary Fund. The incumbent conservative party,
New Democracy, argued in favor of the current austerity measures and Greece’s continuation in the
European Union. The opposition party, Syriza, supported the renegotiation of Greece’s debt and,
if better conditions were not agreed upon, the possibility of Greece leaving the European Union.10
During these weeks, the term Grexit started to become common in national and international
media, and debates on dramatic policy changes dominated the political arena of the country.
This uncertainty period started on December 8, 2014 (hereafter t0) when Prime Minister
Samaras decided to bring forward by two months the following year’s Presidential election. This
announcement was unprecedented, as it was the first time a Presidential election took place before
the end of the incumbent’s term.11 Markets did not anticipate the news. The Athens stock
10Syriza’s Radical Left Manifesto supported the nationalization of banks and promised “an audit
of the public debt and renegotiation of interest due and suspension of payments until the economy
has revived and growth and employment return”.
11In Greece, the President is elected for a five-year term by the Parliament. The nominated
candidate must achieve a supermajority (200 out of 300 votes) during the first and second rounds. If
these were to fail, then the candidate would only need 180 votes in the third, and final, round. From
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exchange dropped 13% that same day, being its biggest one-day fall since December 1987.12 Panel
A in Figure 3-5 shows how the 6-month CDS price on Greek sovereign bonds increased by 136%
after the announcement at t0. Policy uncertainty rose even further when, three weeks after t0,
the Presidential election failed. Overall, the surprise announcement and the failed Presidential
election led to significant political turmoil in Greece.13 Panel B in Figure 3-5 plots the cumulative
abnormal returns for Athens Stock Exchange when compared to FTSE Euro 100 during this period.
As expected there was a significant drop on the day of the announcement and a subsequent decline
in Greek returns afterwards.
In the event of all Presidential voting rounds failing, the Greek Constitution states that the
Parliament must be dismissed and a snap election must be called within ten days. Therefore, on
December 30 (hereafter tA) Primer Minister Samaras announced that Legislative Elections would
be held on January 25 (t1) to elect a new Parliament. After three weeks of campaigning, Syriza
won the election, attaining 149 seats in the 300-seat Parliament and being able to form government
that same week. Alexis Tsipras was sworn in as Prime Minister the day after the elections. Figure
3-6 summarizes the key events taking place during this period and their political consequences.
After the surprise announcement at t0 and the political turmoil that followed, depositor
withdrawal behavior changed significantly. Figure 3-7 plots the daily fraction of early withdrawals
over our sample period. Before the announcement at t0, early withdrawals account for 0.04%
of total time deposits each day. After t0, we observe the percentage of early withdrawals rising
steadily and reaching average daily values of 0.28% of total accounts. This time deposit flight was
not exclusive to our bank. Figure 3-8 plots our bank’s time deposit index relative to the same
index for the entire Greek banking system. Both series follow the same trend, and depositors were
withdrawing their deposit amounts throughout the Greek banking system.
The characteristics of depositors withdrawing early also changed during this period. Panels
A and B in Table 3.2 summarize depositor characteristics and account features for the average
early withdrawal before and after t0, respectively. After the surprise announcement, depositors
1974 to 2008, all Presidential elections were successful with at least the two largest parties reaching
a consensus. In 2009, however, the opposition party threatened to challenge the government’s
Presidential candidate, and early elections were announced before even the Presidential vote had
taken place. In December 2014, tensions continued between the government and the opposition
party, and for the first time a Presidential election was announced before the end of the incumbent’s
term.
12See, for example: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/09/stock-markets
-tumble-as-greece-calls-election
13See, for example: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-30495578
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withdrawing early have, on average, a longer relationship with the bank and a larger fraction
of them are bank employees. Moreover, early withdrawals have greater deposit amounts, lower
interest rates and are almost exclusively denominated in euros. These changes suggest that the
cost of waiting until maturity increased for depositors. In the next sections we discuss and quantify
the different motives driving early withdrawals during this period of policy uncertainty in Greece.
3.3 Isolating Depositor Withdrawal Due to Coor-
dination and Fundamental Motives
3.3.1 Empirical Strategy
To explain the change in depositor behavior during the period of policy uncertainty between t0 and
t1, we differentiate between three motives for early withdrawals: 1) idiosyncratic liquidity motives;
2) expectations about how other depositors will behave; and 3) exposure to policy risk. In order to
isolate the effect of each motive, we use difference-in-differences methodologies around the political
events taking place at t0, tA and t1. These dates introduced new motives for early withdrawals
and changed depositors’ incentives depending on their maturity date. Figure 3-9 maps the events
to the different exposures and motives depositors face.
Before t0 it was a “quiet period” with no abnormal levels of policy uncertainty. It was a stable
period for the Greek banking and financial sectors. Panels A and B of Figure 3-10 show prices for
the Greek CDS across different maturities and the spread of the Greek 10-year bond with respect
to the German 10-year bond. In the months leading to the announcement at t0, both time series
experienced very low levels and no unusual volatility. During this period, Greece had just returned
to the markets, and the general feeling in the press was that of quiet times. Our sample also shows
signs of optimism from time depositors. We observe that during these months new deposits have
larger deposit amounts and longer maturities. In our empirical strategy, we assume that before t0
all early withdrawals are driven exclusively by idiosyncratic motives (e.g., liquidity needs).
The announcement at t0 marked the start of a period of large policy uncertainty in Greece,
as described in Section 3.2.3. After the announcement at t0 the 6-month CDS price on Greek
sovereign bonds increased by 136%. This event exposed time depositors with longer maturities
to policy risk in the future, since it increased the probability of a change of government and
the implementation of new policies affecting fundamentals (both of the bank and the country).
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However, time depositors with shorter maturities (before t1) did not face policy risk (“treatment
group”), because new policies could not be implemented until after the election at t1. However,
the announcement at t0 changed expectations for our treated depositors. In particular, it changed
their expectations about the likelihood of the bank failing because of other depositors’ withdrawal
behavior. In fear of the bank becoming insolvent if enough depositors with longer maturities
withdrew their deposit amounts, some depositors with shorter maturities decided to withdraw
early. We exploit these differences in risk exposure across depositors based on their maturity date
to isolate the change in withdrawals due to expectations about how other depositors will behave.
We also show that, during the period between t0 and t1, there were no short-run changes in the
bank fundamentals. Both the assets and liabilities of the bank remained unchanged after the
announcement at t0. Therefore, we claim that additional withdrawals from depositors with shorter
maturities taking place after t0 are driven by coordination motives.
After t1, all depositors faced policy risk, because changes in policies affecting the bank’s and
the country’s fundamentals (e.g., Grexit, capital controls) could be implemented by the new
government. To identify changes in withdrawal behavior due exclusively to exposure to policy
risk, we exploit the announcement at tA. This was an announcement of the election date t1.
Effectively, tA is a news shock that reveals exposure to policy risk for depositors with short-run
maturities. After tA, depositors with maturity dates before t1 knew that they would not be exposed
(“control group”), while those with maturity dates after t1 were now certain that they will face
policy risk if they wait until maturity (“treatment group”). Before the announcement at tA, both
groups of depositors are equally uncertain about their exposure. However, after the exact date
of the election is revealed, their exposure changes differently depending on their maturity date.
We compare withdrawal behavior of these two types of depositors before and after tA to isolate
changes in withdrawal behavior driven exclusively by exposure to policy risk.
Finally, we need to address two additional challenges to isolate depositor withdrawal motives
during the period around t0, tA and t1. The first relates to the pattern in early withdrawals over
the maturity length as described in Section 3.2.2. Due to the inverted U-shape relationship between
days to maturity and withdrawal behavior, an event study around the events will result in biased
estimates. In particular, it will also capture intrinsic patterns in depositors’ withdrawal behavior
that are uncorrelated with changes in expectations and exposure to policy risk. To control for
these patterns we need a control group with deposit accounts that have the same days to maturity,
enabling us to compare deposits at the same point in the inverted U-shape curve.
The second challenge for identification is the interest payments taking place on January 1
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(which coincide with tA). As already mentioned in Section 3.2.2, our bank pays accrued interests
on January 1 to all time deposits. These payments generate a discontinuity in forgone returns and
can lead to strategic withdrawal behavior before and after this interest payment. These additional
withdrawals would be uncorrelated with policy uncertainty and could bias our estimates. For this
purpose, we use as control group deposits around the interest payment on July 1, when there were
no abnormal levels of policy uncertainty.
In the next sections we develop this empirical strategy in more detail.
3.3.2 Identifying Coordination Motives: Expectations about
Behavior of Other Depositors
In this section, we isolate depositor withdrawal behavior driven exclusively by changes in expecta-
tions about other depositors’ withdrawals.
Difference-in-Differences Approach
We compare withdrawal behavior of depositors with short-run maturity expiration (maturities
before t1) before and after the surprise announcement at t0. Before t0, all depositors withdrawals
are driven by idiosyncratic motives. As already discussed, between t0 and the national election
at t1 new policies (e.g., deposit haircuts, Grexit) could not be implemented. Therefore, after t0,
depositors with accounts maturing before t1 face no exposure to policy risk. These depositors
could wait until maturity without fear of losing their deposits because of policy changes. However,
after t0, depositors with longer maturity expiration changed their expectations about fundamentals
(both of the country and the bank) further into the future (when their deposits mature). As a
result, some of these depositors with maturities after the election started to withdraw their deposit
amounts. The announcement at t0 had an effect on depositors with short-run maturity expiration
by effectively changing their expectations about other depositors’ (longer maturity expiration)
withdrawal behavior.
As our treated group we consider time deposits maturing in the three weeks prior to t1 (window
starting three weeks after t0). If depositors in this group decide to withdraw right after t0, then
they are willing to give up their accrued interests up to that moment to avoid the possibility of
the bank failing because of too many withdrawals from other depositors. Depositors withdrawing
early after t0 have higher responsiveness to other depositors’ withdrawal behavior than those who
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decide to wait.
We restrict our sample to deposits maturing over a short window in order to control for endoge-
nous selection of maturity dates and to make accounts comparable in terms of days to maturity.
We will compare early withdrawal behavior of these depositors for a three-week period before and
after t0. These deposits are not exposed to fundamental policy risk. With this comparison we
capture the additional withdrawal behavior due exclusively to changes in expectations about how
other depositors behave. The upper panel in Figure 3-11 shows the time periods and maturity
dates that we use for our treated group.
To isolate the effect, we need to control for observed patterns in withdrawal behavior across
maturity lengths. We also need to take into account interest payments on January 1, 2015. As
already described in previous sections, interest payments can generate strategic behavior on deposit
withdrawals before and after the payment date, e.g., depositors have incentives to wait until interest
are paid on January 1, 2015. Not accounting for either of these patterns would result in a downward
bias of our estimates. To address these concerns, we use as a control group time deposits maturing
in a three-week window after July 1, 2014, when there was also an interest payment. This period
was a time of financial stability, with no abnormal patterns in early withdrawals. To make our
control group comparable to our treatment group, we use as a placebo date (hereafter tPlacebo0 ) a
day three weeks before interest payments. We will compare depositors in our control group before
and after this placebo date. The lower panel in Figure 3-11 shows the time periods and maturity
dates that we use for our control group.
To formalize the differential effect on withdrawal behavior across treatment and control groups,
we run the following difference-in-differences estimation:
Withdrawalit = δ Treatedi + λ Postt + β Treatedi × Postt + γ′Xit + it , (3.1)
where the dependent variable Withdrawal is a dummy equal to one if the depositor withdraws
funds before maturity. Treated refers to deposits maturing during the treatment period (three
weeks before t1), as opposed to those in the control group (three weeks after July 1). Post is a
dummy equal to one for the period after t0 and t
placebo
0 . Xit is the set of covariates accounting for
depositor and account characteristics.  is an error term. The coefficient β will be our difference-
in-differences estimate, capturing the additional increase in withdrawal behavior due exclusively
to coordination motives driven by changes in expectations about other depositors’ behavior.
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Identification/Assumptions
To identify the difference-in-differences estimates in our specification, we need parallel trends of
treatment and control groups before t0 and t
Placebo
0 . Panel A of Table 3.3 shows the fraction of early
withdrawals as a percentage of total time deposits before and after t0 and t
placebo
0 for treatment and
control groups. In the three weeks prior to t0 and t
placebo
0 , early withdrawals account for 0.40% of
deposits for both treatment and control groups. The pool of depositors and account characteristics
in both groups are not significantly different.
For identification we also need that there are short-run changes in the banks’ fundamentals
after t0. In this exercise we are assuming that all additional withdrawals after t0 are driven
exclusively by changes in depositors’ expectations about other depositors’ withdrawal behavior.
Therefore, we need to ensure that during the three weeks following t0 there is (1) no change in the
banks’ fundamentals, and (2) no changes in factors contributing to idiosyncratic risk. To ensure
(1), we check that both the assets and liabilities of our bank are not affected after the event. On
the liabilities side, time deposits constitute almost 60% of the bank’s liabilities. During our sample
period, the bank had access to funds from the ECB and ELA at the same rates. On the asset
sides, there was no haircut at the current solvent portfolio, and the pricing of shares of our bank
did not change during our sample period. We provide more details supporting assumption (1) in
Appendix C.1.
Identification assumption (2) assumes that idiosyncratic withdrawals remain the same before
and after t0 and t
placebo
0 . We also assume that the incentives driving the three data patterns
described in Section 3.2.1 remain the same for both treatment and control groups throughout our
exercise. We check unemployment rates during our period, as well as pension payments. Nothing
changed between December and January, when compared to our baseline period. We give more
details in Appendix C.2.
Results
Panel A in Table 3.3 shows that, after the surprise announcement at t0, early withdrawals increased
to 1% in the treatment group, while increasing only to 0.66% in the control group. Panel B in
Table 3.3 presents the results from estimating Equation 3.1. Column (1) reports the difference-
in-differences coefficient to be positive and significant at a 10% significance level. Depositors with
short-run maturity expiration and who are not exposed to policy risk are 68% more likely to
withdraw their deposit amounts before maturity than the baseline probability. This result holds
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after controlling for depositor and account characteristics in Column (2). Our claim is that this
increase is due exclusively to changes in expectations about other depositors’ behavior.
3.3.3 Identifying Fundamental Motives: Depositor Expo-
sure to Policy Risk
In this section, we isolate the effect of exposure to policy risk on early withdrawal behavior of
depositors.
Difference-in-Differences-in-Differences Approach
We exploit the election date announcement at tA, which took place three weeks after the sur-
prise announcement at t0 and three weeks before the national election at t1. After the surprise
announcement at t0, depositors knew that there was the possibility of going to elections in the
near future (but at least six weeks later).14 However, the exact date of the election was unknown
until tA, when the Prime Minister made the official announcement. He could have delayed the
announcement by up to ten days or set the election date a week before or a week after. Therefore,
tA is a news shock on t1 that revealed depositors’ exact exposure date to policy risk. Before tA
there was no uncertainty on who would win the election, but on when this election would take
place.15
Before tA, time deposits maturing three weeks before and after the election at t1 did not know
whether their deposit would be exposed to policy risk or not. We assume maturity dates for
these deposits are predetermined at the time of the announcement, since depositors could not have
foreseen the upcoming events at the time of origination. This allows us to compare time deposits
with maturity dates three weeks before t1 (control group) with those maturing three weeks after t1
(treatment group). After t0, both groups face changes in expectations of other depositors’ behavior.
After tA, only the treatment group is also exposed to policy risk.
14In the event of all Presidential voting rounds failing after the surprise announcement at t0, the
Greek Constitution states that the Parliament must be dismissed and a snap national election must
be called within ten days. After an unsuccessful third round on December 29, Primer Minister
Samaras announced on December 30 (hereinafter tA) that national elections for a new Parliament
would take place on January 25 (t1). The current Parliament was therefore dissolved the following
day, and the pre-election period began on January 1. After three weeks of campaigning, Syriza
won the election and was able to form government.
15There was no uncertainty on the outcome of the national election. Polls before and after tA
gave an undisputed victory to Syriza.
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Despite having now both treatment and control groups, a difference-in-differences approach
will not identify the effect of policy risk. As in the previous exercise, depositors will be in different
points in the inverted U-shape curve described in Section 3.2.2, because of differences in days
to maturity between treatment and control groups. Estimates would be upward biased, since the
number of withdrawals in the control period will always be lower than those in the treatment group.
Additionally, we need to account for strategic behavior around interest payments on January 1,
2015.
There is also an additional challenge for identification when compare to the previous exercise
in Section 3.3.2. These new concern stems from the fact that accounts in the control group start
maturing in the period after tA. By construction, a time deposit that has matured cannot be
withdrawn early, leading to an attrition problem in our sample. To account for this trend we use
a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) estimator. As our additional control we use time
deposits maturing between in the six weeks following the interest payments on July 1, 2014. As
tPlaceboA we consider July 1, and as t
Placebo
1 we consider a date three weeks after interest payments.
These accounts allow us to we control for this pattern in the maturing structure of the data.
Figure 3-12 illustrates the main events and maturity periods that we exploit for both treatment
and control groups.
To formalize the differential effect on withdrawal behavior across treatment and control groups,
we run the following triple-differences specification:
Withdrawalit = β0 + β1 Treatedi + β2 Postt + β3 Maturityi (3.2)
+ β4 Treatedi ×Maturityi + β5 Treatedi × Postt + β6 Postt ×Maturityi
+ β7 Treatedi × Postt ×Maturityi + γ′Xit + it ,
where the dependent variable Withdrawal is a dummy equal to one if the depositor withdrew
funds before maturity. Treated refers to time deposits maturing in the six weeks after tA, as
opposed to those in the control group that mature in the six weeks after July 1, 2014. Post is a
dummy equal to one for the period after tA and the equivalent one in the control group, t
Placebo
A .
Maturity refers to deposits maturing after t1 and the equivalent one in the control group, t
Placebo
1 .
Xit is a set of covariates controlling for depositor characteristics and account features.  is an
error term. The coefficient β7 corresponds to the difference-in-differences-in-differences coefficient
(DDD), quantifying the additional withdrawals due to exposure to policy risk.
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Identification/Assumptions
To identify the estimates in triple-differences specification, we need parallel trends of treatment and
control groups before tA and t
Placebo
A . Panel A in Table 3.4 shows the fraction of early withdrawals
for both treatment and control groups. In the treatment period, we see that both treatment and
control groups follow parallel trends in the periods before the event tA. The same happens between
treatment and control groups in the control period around tPlacebpA . Moreover, in the period before
t0 and t
placebo
0 all four groups have similar levels of withdrawals.
Another identification concern relates to the interest payment taking place on January 1 and
July 1. For our effects to be identified we must have that the average interest payment across
control and treatment groups is not significantly different. Panel B in Table 3.4 shows that the
interest payments do not vary across all four group of depositors in the period before tA. Finally,
as in the previous exercise, we also need to assume that idiosyncratic withdrawals remain the same
before and after tA and t
placebo
A . That is, we assume that the three data patterns described in
Section 3.2.1 remain the same before and after the events.
Results
Panel A in Table 3.4 shows how the largest increase in the share of early withdrawals corresponds
to the period after the news shock tA for depositors holding accounts with maturity date after t1.
The fraction of withdrawals jumps from 1.06%to 2.73%. This increase suggests that depositors
discovering their exposure to policy risk faced a higher cost to waiting until maturity and decided
to withdraw their deposit amounts early. Panel B in Table 3.4 reports estimates from Equation
3.3. The DDD coefficient is positive and significant at a 1% significance level, and it is larger
in magnitude than the one associated with coordination risk. Our results show that policy risk
increases the probability of running by 192% when compared to the baseline. This large effect
also mitigates concerns regarding our assumption that changes in coordination risk might drive
the results.
3.4 Heterogeneity Analysis and Other Tests
So far we have shown that, on average, the probability of early withdrawal increases due to
coordination and fundamental policy motives. In this section we address whether there is additional
heterogeneity in the withdrawal behavior of depositors across different subgroups.
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3.4.1 Depositor and Account Characteristics
Panel A of Tables 3.7 and 3.8 present estimates for subsamples based on account and depositor
characteristics. Columns (1) and (2) split the sample by gender. Withdrawal behavior across men
and women is only statistically different when faced with changes in their expectations of other
depositors’ behavior. When exposed to such changes, men are, on average, more likely to withdraw
their deposits before maturity. Columns (3) and (4) split the sample by deposit size (above or below
the median deposit amount of 35,000e). Once again, accounts with greater deposit amounts only
react significantly differently from accounts with smaller deposit amounts when affected by changes
in expectations of the behavior of others. Columns (5), (6) and (7) divide our sample by maturity
length. Six-months deposit contracts are the ones driving the results after t0 and the change
in expectations. After tA and changes in exposure to policy risk, three-months and six-months
contracts are statistically different from the one-year contracts. Finally, Columns (8) and (9) show
that after t0 and tA there is no differential effect of treatment on deposits in Euros and deposits
in foreign currencies.
Panels B of Tables 3.7 and 3.9 show estimates for subsamples depending on depositor-bank
relationships. Columns (1) and (2) compare depositors with other financial products with the
bank (mortgages, loans, and credit cards) with depositors with no other products with the bank.
This split only has a differential effect after tA and exposure to policy risk. Depositors with other
products are significantly more likely to withdraw than those with no additional products. Columns
(3) and (4) look at the number of years the depositor has hold at least one time deposit with the
bank. Depositors with less than two years relationship with the bank are significantly more likely
to withdraw early after both news shocks. Finally, Columns (5) and (6) consider the number of
times the time deposit account has been previously renewed. This has no differential effect in any
of the specifications.
3.4.2 Geographical Heterogeneity
In this section we analyze whether there is geographical heterogeneity in the withdrawal behavior
of depositors. Table 3.10 compares results for Athens with the rest of the country. This split of
the data is not significant when considering depositor withdrawal after exposure to policy risk.
However, when facing changes in expectations on other depositors’ behavior, our estimates are
driven by depositors outside Athens. Table 3.11 differentiates between depositors in large and
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small branches. Once again estimates vary significantly only after t0, but not after tA. Finally, we
consider geographical heterogeneity across regions based on their political views. Table 3.12 shows
results across municipalities that favored Grexit versus those that did not. We find no differential
withdrawal behavior across these types of regions.
To further understand geographical heterogeneity after t0 and changes in expectations of other
depositors’ withdrawals, we consider whether there was a geographical pattern in this change in
withdrawal behavior and some suggestive evidence of a contagion effect. In particular, we focus
on the presence of clusters in withdrawal behavior across nearby branches. Figure 3-13 plots
the spatial autocorrelation across branches, measured by local Moran’s Ii and using as weighting
matrix the inverse of the distance between branches. We find that after the surprise announcement
at t0 there was a significant change in spatial autocorrelation in the northern region of Greece.
This correlation in withdrawals of nearby branches in this region is exclusive to the period between
t0 and tA (when depositors with shorter maturity expiration were solely reacting to changes in
expectations of other depositors’ withdrawals, but were not exposed to policy risk). This spatial
autocorrelation disappears after tA, when depositors with shorter maturity expiration also faced
exposure to policy risk.
3.5 How large are the effects of the various mo-
tives?
3.5.1 Using cost and foregone return
In this section we exploit the discontinuity in accrued interests on July 1, 2014, to compute the
elasticity of withdrawals with respect to changes in forgone returns. For this purpose, we consider
time deposits maturing in a three-week window starting three-weeks after the payment at t0. Due to
the inverted U-shape relationship between days to maturity and withdrawal behavior described in
Section 3.2.2, we need a control group to disentangle normal withdrawal behavior from withdrawals
driven exclusively by the exogenous fall in accrued interests. We use as a placebo date a day
when there were no exceptional interest payments: October 1, 2014. We compare the withdrawal
behavior for deposits with the same days to maturity as the treatment group before and after
October 1. These accounts act as a control group for deposits in our treated period. Figure 3-
14 shows the main dates that we use in this section for both treatment and control groups. Both
107
groups of depositors have deposits that mature in “quiet times” with no unusual policy uncertainty.
Panel A of Table 3.13 shows the fraction of early withdrawals as a percentage of total time
deposits for both treatment and control groups before and after July 1 and October 1, respectively.
We observe that withdrawal behavior for both groups of depositors is not significantly different
before interest payments, with 0.54% depositors withdrawing early in the treatment group and
0.56% in the control group. After interest payments, the fraction of early withdrawals in the
treatment group increased relative to the control group. The percentage of withdrawals in the
treatment group rises to 0.86% after interest payments, while withdrawals in the control group
drop to 0.46%. This fall in the control group matches the inverted U-shape pattern we described
in Section 3.2.2, and it is common across other months when no interest payments were made.
To formalize this differential effect on withdrawal behavior across treatment and control, we
run the following difference-in-differences estimation:
Withdrawalit = δ Treatedi + λ Postt + β Treatedi × Postt + γ′Xit + it , (3.3)
where the dependent variable Withdrawal is a dummy equal to one if the depositor withdrew funds
before maturity. Treated refers to deposits maturing during the treatment period when there is an
interest payment. Post refers to the period after interest are paid on July 1 for the treatment group
and the period after October 1 for the control group. Xit is the set of covariates accounting for
depositor and account characteristics.  is an error term. The coefficient β will be our difference-
in-differences estimate, capturing the additional increase in withdrawal behavior due exclusively
to a fall in the penalty for early withdrawal.
Results from estimating Equation 3.3 in our sample are reported in Panel B of Table 3.13.
Column (1) shows estimates for the baseline specification without covariates. The estimated
coefficient β is 0.0088, implying that a payment of e494 in accrued interests (equivalent to 1.29% of
deposit amount) leads to a 154% increase in the baseline probability of early withdrawal. Column
(2) shows that this result holds after controlling for account features (deposit amount, maturity,
interest rate, currency) and depositor characteristics (age, gender, bank employee, other products
with the bank, previous renewals). Therefore, we find that even in quiet times depositors are very
elastic to changes in accrued interests, with a payment of e100 making it 30.4% more likely for
depositors to withdraw funds before maturity. Next, we use this estimate for withdrawal elasticity
with respect to accrued interests to calibrate in terms of interest rate changes in withdrawals in
Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3.
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We have shown that an interest payment equivalent to 1% of deposit amount leads, on average,
to a 120% increase in the baseline probability. Using this result, we can estimate the necessary
interest payment that could explain an equivalent increase in withdrawals. We get that, on average,
the increase in early withdrawals due to changes in expectations of other depositors’ withdrawal
behavior is analogous to the one generated by an interest payment of e293 (0.77% of deposit amount
and 26% foregone return). Similarly, we can estimate the interest payment that is necessary to
explain an equivalent increase in the withdrawal probability due to exposure to policy risk. We
find that an interest payment of e612 (1.61% of deposit amount and 72% foregone return) would
generate an equivalent increase in the probability of early withdrawal. We interpret these results as
the amount the bank will need to increase monthly interest rates to avoid the resulting withdrawal
of time depositors in the following month (equivalent to an additional 21% annual return).
3.5.2 Using CDS movements
Between the first news shock at t0 and the national election at t1, the 6-month CDS price increased
by 219% compared with the previous “quiet period”. Right after t0, there was a 136% increase
in the short-run CDS price which corresponds to a 68% increase in withdrawals due to changes in
expectations on other depositors’ withdrawal behavior. Following the same logic, after tA there was
a 27% increase in the price of the short-run CDS, which resulted in 192% additional withdrawals
due to exposure to policy risk.
3.5.3 Comparing with total Greek deposit withdrawals and
other episodes
In the month after t0, 1.21% of depositors will withdraw because of idiosyncratic, liquidity motives.
Our estimates predict that there will be 2.04% of depositors that will withdraw due to changes
in their expectations of other depositors’ behavior. Moreover, there will be an additional 3.55%
of depositors that will withdraw early because of their exposure to policy risk. Finally, we also
account for 1.2% depositors withdrawing their deposits because of the interest payments after
January 1. All in all, we account for 8% of time depositors withdrawing their deposit amounts
after t0. In our bank, 10% of time depositors withdrew their deposits in the month after t0. In the
entire Greek banking system, 8% of time depositors withdrew their deposit amounts in the month
after t0.
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Other Episodes Where Country Fundamentals Changed
Italy has recently also suffered from policy uncertainty due to the unexpected coalition government
supported by the populist Five Star Movement and the right-wing League, discussing the possibility
of exiting the Eurozone (‘Italexit’, ‘Italeave’, or—domestically—‘Euroscita’). Prior to the March
2018 elections, both parties had antagonized each other and expressed no intention of cooperating
when in government. Coalition negotiations between both parties became public in May, when a
draft for a coalition agreement was leaked in the media.16 These news increased policy uncertainty
in the country.
When comparing the Italian episode to our analysis of the Greek elections, we can distinguish
between two key events. First event took place on May 15, 2018, when the draft for a coalition
agreement was leaked. The second event is the formation of a new government on May 29, 2018.
The first event can be compared to our shock at t0, since it created policy risk for depositors
with long-run maturity expiration, but not for short-run maturity deposits (since policies could
not be implemented until after the appointment of government). Depositors with shorter maturity
expiration only faced a change in their expectations on how other depositors will behave. The
second event is comparable to our shock at t1, when a new government is appointed and all
depositors are exposed to policy risk.
Over this 2-week the CDS price on Italian sovereign bonds increased by 177% during this period
of policy uncertainty. During that quarter, time deposits hold by households with maturities shorter
than two years decreased by 31.6%.17 As in Greece, there were no bankruns, only a progressive
leakage of depositors out of the system during that period. For an equivalent increase in CDS
prices, our estimates predict that, in the month following the election, there will be a 10.5% fall
in time deposits maturities shorter than one year.
Other Episodes Where Bank Fundamentals Changed
Another episode of interest is the bankrun on Northern Rock in 2007. On September 14, 2007,
Northern Rock sought and received a liquidity support facility from the Bank of England. The
motive for such an emergency measure was the run on deposits of Northern Rock that took place
16This draft reclaimed radical changes to the Stability and Growth Pact, along with e250 billion
from the ECB. It also supported “the introduction of specific technical procedures for single states
to leave the Eurozone and regain monetary sovereignty.”
17See Bank of Italy’s sectoral breakdown of deposits:
https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/reports.do?node=1000003191
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Friday 14 and Monday 17 September, 2007. It all started in August 9, 2007, when interbank
and other financial markets froze. Because of Northern Rock’s funding model (requiring mortgage
securitization), markets anticipated that there was a probability that the bank will run into trouble
because of its next securitization being schedule for September 2007. During August 10 and mid-
September Northern Rock and the British government and regulators tried to find a solution to
the liquidity crisis.18 During this period, the 5-year CDS price of Northern Rock increased 180%.
Northern Rock lost £10 billion of its £30 billion savings book (33% loss), with £4.4 billion in
deposits withdrawn on September 14 (21% of total deposit amount).19 Our model predicts that
such an increase in the CDS will result in 11% of time depositors leaving the bank.20
Other recent event is related to Washington Mutual (WaMu) and its two bankruns. WaMu’s
first bank run took place on July 12, 2008, centered in Southern California after the federal
government seized IndyMac following a $1.3 billion bank run. The second run started on September
11, 2008, when Moody’s rated WaMu’s financial strength at D+ and downgraded the company’s
debt rating to junk status. These news and Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy on September 15,
2008, sparked another bank run. WaMu depositors withdrew $16.7 billion out of their savings and
checking accounts over the next 10 days. These withdrawals accounted for 9% of WaMu’s total
deposits. On September 26, 2008,Washington Mutual filed for bankruptcy. In the month prior to
the first bank run, the 5-year CDS of WaMu increased by almost 100%. In September 16, 2008
(last day WaMu was traded on CDS markets), the CDS premium increased by more than 100%.
Our estimates predict that such increases in CDS will result in 6% withdrawals of total deposits.
3.6 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper we isolate and quantify deposit withdrawals due to three different motives: liquidity,
exposure to policy risk, or expectations about how other depositors will behave. This new approach
18The main three options under discussion were: 1) Northern Rock finding a solution to its
liquidity crisis on its own by means of short-term money markets and securitization; 2) Northern
Rock being taken over by another major retail bank; and 3) Northern Rock receiving a support
liquidity facility from the Bank of England and guaranteed by the Government. For details, see:
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmtreasy/56/5607.htm
19See, e.g., Financial Times “Northern Rock fall sees outflow of savings,”
https://www.ft.com/content/2e3bc984-9a07-11dc-ad70-0000779fd2ac
20One key difference between Greek and British deposits is the level of insurance. While Greek
retail deposits are insured up to e100,000, the UK government only guarantees 100% of the first
£2,000 and 90% of the next £33,000. That is, in the UK only £31,700 are insured per deposit.
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uses variation induced by maturity expiration of time deposits around the large policy uncertainty
events and differentiates between deposit withdrawals due to direct exposure to policy risk and
those due to expectations about behavior of other depositors. After a policy uncertainty shock that
doubled the short-run CDS price of Greek sovereign bonds, we find that early deposit withdrawal
probability quadrupled. According to our estimates, two-thirds of this increase are due to direct
exposure to policy risk, while the remainder is driven by changes in expectations of behavior of
other depositors. In the last part of the paper, we quantify these effects in terms of forgone interest
rates and changes in short-run CDS prices and compare our estimates to episodes of depositor
withdrawals in Italy and in two recent bank run episodes.
112
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics Entire Sample
Mean
(1)
S.D
(2)
Min
(3)
Median
(4)
Max
(5)
N
(6)
Panel A: Depositor Characteristics
Age 65 15 18 66 100 >300,000
Female 0.45 0.5 0 0 1 >300,000
Income 25,363 20,880 1,103 21,137 197,609 >40,000
Education (years) 12 3 0 12 20 >200,000
Other Products 0.3 0.46 0 0 1 >300,000
Years with Deposit Account 2.3 2.7 0.06 1 56 >300,000
Bank Employee 0.04 0.2 0 0 1 >300,000
Athens 0.34 0.47 0 0 1 >300,000
Panel B: Deposit Account Characteristics
Interest Rate 1.94 0.95 0.01 2.2 8.19 >300,000
Initial Balance 57,281 65,490 687 36,000 500,000 >300,000
TD in Euros 0.77 0.42 0 1 1 >300,000
Length (days) 164 119 21 130 365 >300,000
Account Renewals 6.5 10.6 1 3 1513 >300,000
Panel C: Total Deposits, Depositors and Branches
Number of Accounts >100,000 - - - - -
Number of Depositors >100,000 - - - - -
Active TDs per day >100,000 - - - - -
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Figure 3-1: Distribution of Characteristics and Withdrawals Across Subgroups
Notes: On the left, density plots for distribution of deposits across deposit and depositor
characteristics. On the right, fraction of deposits withdrawn before maturity over same
characteristics. 114
Figure 3-2: Origination and Maturity Dates
PANEL A: Total Deposits Originated Each Week
PANEL B: Total Deposits Maturing Each Week
Notes: Panel A shows total deposits originated each week, and Panel B plots total
deposits maturing in a given week. Both graphs consider all time deposits in our sample.
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Figure 3-3: Early Withdrawals as a Function of Days to Maturity
Note: The y-axis shows the percentage of total depositors that withdraw their deposit amounts
before maturity. The x-axis is the fraction of maturity length completed at withdrawal. We show
this relationship for the two most popular maturity lengths in our sample: three and six months
maturities.
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Figure 3-4: CDS Prices and Stock Returns Before and After Surprise Announcement
(t0)
PANEL A: Accrued Interests and Fraction of Early Withdrawals
PANEL B: Foregone Returns from Early Withdrawal
Notes: Panel A shows the cost of early withdrawal measured by total accrued interests
(solid line) and the weekly fraction of early withdrawals (scatter plot). On July 1, all
time deposits have their accrued interests paid. Panel B plots the foregone rate of return,
calculated as (Interest Forgone/Interest Received)ˆ(365/Days to Maturity). The shaded
area represent the 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 3-5: CDS Prices and Stock Returns Before and After Surprise Announcement
(t0)
PANEL A: Price of 6-Month Greek CDS
PANEL B: Evolution of Greek Stock Market
Notes: Panel A shows the price of the Greek, 6-month CDS. The vertical lines correspond
to the following events: (1) the surprise announcement (t0) on December 8, 2014; (2)
the election date announcement (tA) on January 1, 2015; and (3) the national election
(t1) on January 25, 2015. Panel B plots the cumulative abnormal returns calculated
for Athens Stock Exchange and FTSE Euro 100, with respect to the days from surprise
announcement (t0) on December 8, 2014.
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Figure 3-6: Main Political Events
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Figure 3-7: Daily Fraction of Early Withdrawals (% of Total Time Deposits)
Note: Plot of the percentage of active deposits that were withdrawn that day and had at least
five days until maturity. The red vertical line corresponds to the announcement of presidential
elections (t0).
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Figure 3-8: Time Deposits in Greek Banking System Compared to our Sample
Note: The solid line represents our bank’s time deposit index, normalized to 100 for September
2014. The dash line plots the same index for the entire Greek banking system. The red vertical
line corresponds to the announcement of presidential elections (t0).
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Figure 3-9: Changes in Withdrawal Motives for Depositors with Short-Run
Maturities
Note: The diagram relates our main three events to the different withdrawal motives faced by
depositors with short-run maturities. Before t0, withdrawals of these depositors are driven only by
idiosyncratic motives. After t0, these depositors also have additional coordination motives, driven
by changes in their expectations of other depositors’ behavior. After tA, depositors receive news
about their exposure to policy risk. Finally, after t1 they will also face policy risk in the form of
new policies being implemented by the new government.
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Figure 3-10: Greek CDS Index and 10-Year Bond
Panel A: Greek CDS for Different Maturities (2010-2015)
Panel B: Greek Bond Spread with respect to German Bond (2010-2015)
Note: Panel A plots the Credit Default Swap Index for Greece, normalized to 100 for
June 2008. The shaded area represents the sample period between March and November
2014. Panel B shows the 10-year Greek bond spread relative to the German 10-year
bond. 123
Figure 3-11: Treatment and Control Groups for Coordination Risk Analysis
Note: The main event is the surprise announcement at t0. The periods to compare are
three weeks before and after the event. The deposits to compare are those maturing
between three and six weeks after the event.
Figure 3-12: Treatment and Control Groups for Policy Risk Analysis
Note: The main event is the election date announcement at tA. The periods to compare
are three weeks before and after the event. The deposits to compare are (1) those
maturing in the three weeks after the event, and (2) those maturing between three and
six weeks after the event.
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Figure 3-13: Spatial Autocorrelation in Deposit Withdrawals across Branches
Note: The red dots correspond to branches with deposit withdrawals exhibiting positive
spatial autocorrelation with nearby branches, as measured by local Moran’s Ii. Spatial
autocorrelation measures the correlation of a variable with itself through space. In this
case, withdrawal behavior in one branch relative to nearby branches. Positive spatial
autocorrelation occurs when similar values occur near one another. The two maps to the
left correspond to the control period with no news shock. The two maps to the right
belong to the treatment period with the news shock at t0. The two top maps represent
the period before the announcement at t0, while the two maps at the bottom correspond
to the period after the surprise news at t0.
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Figure 3-14: Treatment and Control Groups for Cost Elasticity Analysis
Note: The main event is the interest payment at tP . The periods to compare are three
weeks before and after the event. The deposits to compare are those maturing between
three and six weeks after the event.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics for Early Withdrawals
Mean
(1)
S.D
(2)
Min
(3)
Median
(4)
Max
(5)
Panel A: Quiet-Times
Daily % Runners 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.06
Days to maturity 136 104 6 114 364
Length (days) 257 117 21 360 365
Initial Balance 41,188 49,364 2,828 23,500 500,000
Interest Rate 1.86 0.85 0.01 2.1 4
TD in Euros 0.88 0.32 0 1 1
Age 64 16 18 64 100
Female 0.47 0.5 0 0 1
Education (years) 12 3.23 0 12 1 20
Income 24,450 18,678 1,900 20,433 149,569
Bank Employee 0.03 0.18 0 0 1
Years with the Bank 2.2 2.5 0.08 2.7 47
Previous Renewals 3.5 4.7 1 2 97
Other Financial Products 0.34 0.47 0 0 1
Forgone Interest Payment 308 493 0 175 8,180
Panel B: Uncertainty (after t0)
Daily % Runners 0.12 0.07 0.02 0.10 0.28
Days to maturity 129 96 6 105 364
Length (days) 240 109 21 183 360
Initial Balance 58,583 63,591 687 37,000 500,000
Interest Rate 1.67 0.49 0.01 1.75 3.25
TD in Euros 0.93 0.26 0 1 1
Age 63 15 20 63 100
Female 0.45 0.5 0 0 1
Education (years) 13 3.17 0 12 1 20
Income 25,697 19,304 1,900 21,748 193,491
Bank Employee 0.07 0.26 0 0 1
Years with the Bank 2.8 3.5 0.08 1.8 56
Previous Renewals 4.9 6.5 1 3 82
Other Financial Products 0.39 0.49 0 0 1
Forgone Interest Payment 385 531 0 211 8,225
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Table 3.3: Identifying Coordination Risk
PANEL A: Fraction of Early Withdrawals in Coordination Sample
Treatment Group
(uncertainty)
Control Group
(quiet times)
Before t0 0.40 % 0.40 %
After t0 1.00 % 0.66 %
Observations (N) >8,000 >8,000
PANEL B: Difference-in-Differences Estimation for Coordination Risk
Early withdrawal (0/1) (1) (2)
Treatment 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Post t0 0.0026*** 0.0027***
(0.0009) (0.0009)
DiD 0.0027* 0.0027*
(0.0015) (0.0015)
Account Chacteristics No Yes
Depositor Chacteristics No Yes
Observations >30,000 >30,000
Note: Column (2) in PANEL B includes depositor characteristics (gender, age, bank employee,
other products, previous relationship with the bank) and account characteristics (deposit amount,
maturity, rate, currency). Robust standard errors are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1).
128
Table 3.4: Identifying Policy Risk
PANEL A: Fraction of Early Withdrawals in Policy Risk Sample
Treatment Period
(uncertainty)
Control Period
(quiet times)
Control Group
(No Policy Risk)
Treatment Group
(Policy Risk)
Control Group
(No Policy Risky)
Treatment Group
(No Policy Risk)
Before t0 0.40 % 0.49 % 0.40 % 0.41 %
Between t0 and tA 1.00 % 1.06 % 0.66 % 0.64 %
Between tA and t1 0.38 % 2.73 % 0.37 % 0.90 %
Observations (N) >8,000 >8,000 >8,000 >8,000
PANEL B: Interest Payments in Policy Risk Sample
Treatment Period
(uncertainty)
Control Period
(quiet times)
Control Group
(No Policy Risk)
Treatment Group
(Policy Risk)
Control Group
(No Policy Risky)
Treatment Group
(No Policy Risk)
Interest Payment e526 e478 e509 e475
(680) (602) (707) (603)
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Table 3.5: Difference-in-Differences-in-Differences Estimation for Policy Risk
Early withdrawal (0/1) (1) (2)
Treatment 0.0030** 0.0028**
(0.00122) (0.00126)
Maturity (after t1) -0.0016 -0.0016
(0.0010) (0.0011)
Post (after tA) -0.0028*** -0.0028***
(0.0009) (0.0009)
Treatment × Post tA -0.0033** -0.0033**
(0.0015) (0.0015)
Treatment × Post (after tA) 0.0023 0.0025
(0.0019) (0.0019)
Post tA × Maturity (after t1) 0.0104*** 0.0104***
(0.0017) (0.0017)
DDD 0.0127*** 0.0127***
(0.0030) (0.0030)
Account Chacteristics No Yes
Depositor Chacteristics No Yes
Observations >50,000 >50,000
Note: Column (2) includes depositor characteristics (gender, age, bank employee, other products,
previous relationship with the bank) and account characteristics (deposit amount, maturity, rate,
currency). Robust standard errors are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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Table 3.6: Heterogeneity Analysis for Idiosyncratic Subsamples
PANEL A: Depositor and Account Characteristics
Balance Balance 3-month 6-months 1-year Currency Foreign
Early withdrawal (0/1) Female Male <35,000 >35,000 TDs TDs TDs Euros Currency
Treatment 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.004* -0.004* 0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004)
Post Interest -0.002 -0.001 -0.005** 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
DiD 0.0082*** 0.0093*** 0.0105*** 0.0073*** 0.0026 0.0035 0.0166*** 0.0091*** 0.0066
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0030) (0.0019) (0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0019) (0.0047)
Depositor Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Account Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations >15,000 >15,000 >15,000 >15,000 >8,000 >10,000 >12,000 >27,000 >3,000
Baseline Prob. 0.56 0.58 1.00 0.18 0.55 0.45 0.71 0.55 0.69
of Running
Baseline Cost 1.32 1.29 1.18 1.42 0.42 1.02 2.15 1.39 0.59
of Running (% TD)
PANEL B: Depositor-Bank Relationship
No Other Other Less than More than 3 Renewals More than
Early withdrawal (0/1) Products Products 2 years 2 years or Less 3 Renewals
Treatment Group 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Post Interests -0.0003 -0.0051** -0.0028* 0.0000 -0.0025 -0.0005
(0.00115) (0.00241) (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0013)
DiD 0.0067*** 0.0144*** 0.0092*** 0.0083*** 0.0103*** 0.0070***
(0.0019) (0.0038) (0.0026) (0.0021) (0.0027) (0.0021)
Depositor Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Account Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations >25,000 >5,000 >20,000 >20,000 >15,000 >15,000
Baseline Prob. 0.42 0.94 0.78 0.28 0.75 0.34
of Running
Baseline Cost 1.29 1.35 1.25 1.39 1.42 1.17
of Running (% TD)
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses for both Panels A and B ( with *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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Table 3.7: Heterogeneity Analysis for Coordination Subsamples
PANEL A: Depositor and Account Characteristics
Balance Balance 3-month 6-months 1-year Currency Foreign
Early withdrawal (0/1) Female Male <35,000 >35,000 TDs TDs TDs Euros Currency
Treatment Group 0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Post t0 0.0036*** 0.0019 0.0014 0.0037*** 0.0005 0.0012 0.0062*** 0.0028*** 0.0008
(0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0019) (0.0010) (0.0024)
DiD -0.0000 0.0051** -0.0000 0.0053*** -0.0017 0.0086*** -0.0010 0.0034** -0.0037
(0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0016) (0.0035)
Depositor Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Account Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations >15,000 >15,000 >15,000 >15,000 >10,000 >10,000 >10,000 >35,000 >5,000
Baseline Prob. 0.36 0.44 0.59 0.24 0.38 0.36 0.47 0.41 0.31
of Running
Baseline Cost 1.32 1.31 1.17 1.44 0.44 1.00 2.45 1.40 0.57
of Running (% TD)
PANEL B: Depositor-Bank Relationship
No Other Other Less than More than 3 Renewals More than
Early withdrawal (0/1) Products Products 2 years 2 years or Less 3 Renewals
Treatment 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Post t0 0.0023** 0.0037* 0.0011 0.0047*** 0.0011 0.0044***
(0.0010) (0.0020) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0012)
DiD 0.0016 0.0059* 0.0046** 0.0002 0.0044** 0.0008
(0.0016) (0.0034) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0019)
Depositor Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Account Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations >20,000 >10,000 >15,000 >15,000 >15,000 >15,000
Baseline Prob. 0.19 0.95 0.53 0.23 0.54 0.24
of Running
Baseline Cost 1.32 1.30 1.17 1.51 1.39 1.23
of Running (% TD)
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses for both Panels A and B ( with *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1).
132
Table 3.8: Heterogeneity Analysis for Policy Risk Subsamples (Depositor and
Account Characteristics)
Balance Balance 3-month 6-months 1-year Currency Foreign
Early withdrawal (0/1) Female Male <35,000 >35,000 TDs TDs TDs Euros Currency
Treatment 0.001 0.004** 0.001 0.005** 0.001 0.009*** -0.004* 0.003** -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Maturity (after t1) -0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.004*** -0.000 0.004** -0.008*** -0.002* 0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Post (after tA) -0.004*** -0.002 -0.003* -0.003** -0.002 -0.001 -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Treatment × Post (after tA) -0.0017 -0.0046** -0.0021 -0.0043** 0.0002 -0.0091*** 0.0007 -0.00368** 0.000552
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0016) (0.0030)
Treatment × Maturity (after t1) 0.0033 0.0018 0.0014 0.0034 0.0094*** -0.0090*** 0.0085*** 0.0032 -0.0030
(0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0036) (0.0033) (0.0029) (0.0020) (0.0037)
Maturity (after t1) × Post (after tA) 0.0107*** 0.0101*** 0.0091*** 0.0116*** 0.0025 0.0036 0.0212*** 0.0112*** 0.0035
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0027) (0.0020) (0.0025) (0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0018) (0.0045)
DDD 0.0136*** 0.0119*** 0.0106** 0.0148*** 0.0179*** 0.0260*** -0.0033 0.0129*** 0.0106
(0.0043) (0.0042) (0.0044) (0.0042) (0.0058) (0.0051) (0.0049) (0.0033) (0.0065)
Depositor Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Account Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations >20,000 >30,000 >25,000 >25,000 >15,000 >15,000 >15,000 >45,000 >5,000
Baseline Prob. 0.71 0.62 0.72 0.61 0.43 0.48 1.08 0.69 0.39
of Running
Baseline Cost 1.32 1.31 1.17 1.44 0.44 1.00 2.45 1.40 0.58
of Running (% TD)
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses for both Panels A and B ( with *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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Table 3.9: Heterogeneity Analysis for Policy Risk Subsamples (Depositor-Bank
Relationship)
No Other Other Less than More than 3 Renewals More than
Early withdrawal (0/1) Products Products 2 years 2 years or Less 3 Renewals
Treatment 0.001 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.000 0.004** 0.001
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Maturity (after t1) -0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.006*** 0.001 -0.005***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Post (after tA) -0.002** -0.004** -0.002 -0.004*** -0.001 -0.004***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Treatment × Post (after tA) -0.0025 -0.0053 -0.0052** -0.0009 -0.0056** -0.0008
(0.0016) (0.0035) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0020)
Treatment × Maturity (after t1) 0.0036* -0.0004 0.0008 0.0049** 0.0011 0.0041*
(0.0020) (0.0042) (0.0028) (0.0023) (0.0029) (0.0024)
Post (after tA) × Maturity (after t1) 0.0093*** 0.0134*** 0.0090*** 0.0122*** 0.0097*** 0.0111***
(0.0019) (0.0035) (0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0021)
DDD 0.0068** 0.0283*** 0.0197*** 0.0044 0.0161*** 0.0093**
(0.0032) (0.0070) (0.0045) (0.0038) (0.0046) (0.0039)
Depositor Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Account Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations >40,000 >10,000 >30,000 >20,000 >20,000 >30,000
Baseline Prob. 0.59 0.87 0.64 0.70 0.65 0.68
of Running
Baseline Cost 1.32 1.30 1.17 1.52 1.39 1.23
of Running (% TD)
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses for both Panels A and B ( with *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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Table 3.10: Heterogeneity Analysis for City of Athens
(Coordination) (Coordination) (Idiosyncratic) (Idiosyncratic) (Policy) (Policy)
City of Not City of Not City of Not
Runner (0/1) Athens Athens Athens Athens Athens Athens
Treatment 0.003 -0.001 0.004* -0.001 -0.001 0.004**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Post Period 0.005*** 0.002* 0.001 -0.003** -0.004* -0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Treatment × Period -0.0014 0.0048*** 0.0060* 0.0101*** 0.0022 0.0035
( DD) (0.0027) (0.0017) (0.0032) (0.0021) (0.0034) (0.0023)
Post tA -0.0029 -0.0029***
(0.0019) (0.0010)
Treatment × Post tA -0.0035 -0.0030*
(0.0027) (0.0018)
Post tA× Post t1 0.0104*** 0.0105***
(0.0033) (0.0019)
DDD 0.0175*** 0.0107***
(0.0056) (0.0036)
Depositor characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Account characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations >10,000 >20,000 >10,000 >20,000 >15,000 >30,000
Baseline Prob. 0.38 0.40 0.29 0.70 0.66 0.67
of Running
Baseline Cost 1.22 1.37 1.30 1.32 1.35 1.31
of Running (% TD)
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses for both Panels A and B ( with *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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Table 3.11: Heterogeneity Analysis for Small and Large Branches
(Coordination) (Coordination) (Idiosyncratic) (Idiosyncratic) (Policy) (Policy)
Small Large Small Large Small Large
Early Withdrawal (0/1) Branches Branches Branches Branches Branches Branches
Treatment 0.003 -0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.000 0.003**
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Post Period -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.003*** -0.001 -0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Treatment × Post Period -0.0021 0.0037** 0.0091*** 0.0060* 0.0031 0.0022
(DD) (0.0036) (0.0016) (0.0046) (0.0019) (0.0043) (0.0021)
Post tA -0.0020 -0.0030***
(0.0022) (0.0010)
Treatment × Post tA -0.0017 -0.0036**
(0.0033) (0.0017)
Post tA× Post t1 0.0071* 0.0112***
(0.0039) (0.0018)
DDD 0.0137** 0.0125***
(0.0070) (0.0034)
Depositor characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Account characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations >7,000 >23,000 >7,000 >23,000 >10,000 >40,000
Baseline Prob. 0.49 0.38 0.70 0.53 0.66 0.67
of Running
Baseline Cost 1.35 1.31 1.34 1.30 1.35 1.31
of Running (% TD)
Note: Branch size is defined as those below and above the median in their number of time deposit
accounts. Small branches are those with 200 or less daily TD accounts on average, and large
branches are those with more than 200 daily TD accounts on average. Robust standard errors are
in parentheses for both Panels A and B ( with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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Table 3.12: Heterogeneity Analysis on Political Views
(Coordination) (Coordination) (Idiosyncratic) (Idiosyncratic) (Policy) (Policy)
Against Pro-Grexit Against Pro-Grexit Against Pro-Grexit
Early withdrawal (0/1) Grexit (<50%) (>50%) Grexit (<50%) (>50%) Grexit (<50%) (>50%)
Treatment 0.002 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.002 0.003*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Post Period 0.002* 0.003** -0.004** -0.000 0.000 -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Treatment × Post Period 0.0019 0.0032* 0.0094*** 0.0086*** 0.0028 0.0022
(DD) (0.0024) (0.0018) (0.0029) (0.0022) (0.0032) (0.0023)
Post tA -0.0028** -0.0028**
(0.0014) (0.0012)
Treatment × Post tA -0.0041* -0.0028
(0.0023) (0.0019)
Post tA × Post t1 0.0090*** 0.0113***
(0.0026) (0.0021)
DDD 0.0167*** 0.0103***
(0.0051) (0.0038)
Depositor characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Account characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations >10,000 >20,000 >10,000 >20,000 >15,000 >35,000
Baseline Prob. 0.32 0.45 0.75 0.46 0.55 0.73
of Running
Baseline Cost 1.34 1.31 1.32 1.30 1.34 1.30
of Running (% TD)
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses for both Panels A and B ( with *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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Table 3.13: Estimating the Elasticity of Depositors to Interest Payments
PANEL A: Fraction of Early Withdrawals
Treatment Group
(interest payments)
Control Group
(no interest payments)
Before Interest Payment 0.54 % 0.56 %
After Interest Payment 0.86 % 0.46 %
Observations (N) >8,000 >8,000
PANEL B: Difference-in-Differences Estimation
Early withdrawal (0/1) (1) (2)
Treatment -0.00024 -0.00016
(0.001) (0.001)
Post Interest Payment -0.0016 -0.0016
(0.001) (0.001)
DiD 0.0088*** 0.0088***
(0.002) (0.002)
Account Chacteristics No Yes
Depositor Chacteristics No Yes
Observations >30,000 >30,000
Note: Column (2) in PANEL B includes depositor characteristics (gender, age, bank employee,
other products, previous relationship with the bank) and account characteristics (deposit amount,
maturity, rate, currency). Robust standard errors are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1).
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Appendix A
Appendix Chapter 1
A.1 Distribution of Fees and Commissions
Figure A-1: Distribution of Broker Fees Across Borrower Types
Note: Broker fees are expressed in pounds. Internal remortgagors are borrowers
refinancing with the same lender, while external remortgagors are borrowers refinancing
their mortgage with a different lender.
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Figure A-2: Distribution of Commissions Across Borrower Types
Note: Commission rates are expressed as a percentage of the total loan balance. Internal
remortgagors are borrowers refinancing with the same lender, while external remortgagors
are borrowers refinancing their mortgage with a different lender.
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A.2 Geographical Changes in Branch Networks
Figure A-3: Branch closures and opening at the local authority level.
Note: Percentage change in total branches within a local authority district between
December 2014 and January 2017. Data gathered from Experian Goad and Shop*Point
datasets.
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Appendix B
Appendix Chapter 2
B.1 Fit of the model
142
Figure B-1: Model Fit
PANEL A: Training Sample (25% random sample)
PANEL B: Cross-Validation Sample (Out-of-Sample Fit)
Note: The red solid lines are the observed market shares in the data computed as the
sum of originations for each product in each market divided by the total number of
households. The blue dashed lines represent the estimated market shares from the model
calculated as the sum of the individual predicted probabilities. Panel A uses a 25%
random sample, while Panel B is based on the remaining 75% that was not used in the
estimation.
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Figure B-2: Out-of-Sample Fit: Product Characteristics
Note: I compare observed (solid line) and predicted (dash line) market shares across different
product characteritsics. The upper left panel shows market shares for the Big Six, Building
Societies and Challenger Banks. The upper right panel presents them across loan-to-value bands.
Finally, the lower panel plots market shares across initial period deals.
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B.2 Search Cost Distributions
Figure B-3: Search Cost Distributions Across Subpopulations
PANEL A: Geographical Variation
PANEL B: Income Variation
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B.3 Marginal Cost Distributions
Figure B-4: Marginal Cost Estimates
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B.4 Additional Counterfactual: Alternative Pass-
Through
Figure B-5: Alternative Pass-Throughs for Broker Fees
Note: The solid line increases broker fees such that profits per mortgage sale remain the
same as in the baseline with no restrictions for each broker. The dashed line sets broker
fees equal to the median broker fee in the baseline (conditional on being positive).
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Appendix C
Appendix Chapter 3
C.1 No Changes in Idiosyncratic Risk
Identification of our estimates for coordination motives requires that there are no changes in
idiosyncratic withdrawals during the weeks following the surprise announcement on December 8,
2014.
One potential concern is unemployment. If major layoffs took place immediately after the
announcement, deposit withdrawals might be driven by liquidity motives differing from those in
quiet times. Unemployment rates remain stable during December 2014 and January 2015, and
had similar magnitudes to the same months the previous year.1 Moreover, we find no correlation
between changes in regional unemployment figures and changes in deposit withdrawals during this
period.
Another concern, given the age of a large fraction of our depositors, is that after the announce-
ment there was a change in payment of pensions. We have found no evidence of pension amounts
changing during our period or delays/haircuts taking place after the announcement.
Moreover, we have checked the interest rates offered by our bank’s competitors before and
1See Eurostat Database for detailed figures at the NUTS 2 level, available at https://ec.
europa.eu/eurostat/data/database
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after the announcement, and they are all similar to those we observed in quiet times. Therefore,
there seem to be no changes in competition in the time-deposit market during our period.
C.2 No Changes in Bank Fundamentals
Identification of our estimates for coordination motives requires that there are no changes in bank
fundamentals during the weeks following the surprise announcement on December 8, 2014.
C.2.1 Liquidity Measures
The bank tracks short-term liquidity through an index, the Liquidity Assets Ratio (LAR), defined
as:
Liquidity Assets Ratio =
Liquid Assets of up to 30 days maturity
Short term borrowing
(B1)
where LiquidAssets include cash, interbank placements with maturity up to 30 days, compulsory
reserve requirements to Bank of Greece, unencumbered high quality liquid assets, excess collateral
pledged to ECB, inflows from installment loans within 30 days and other assets with maturity up
to 30 days; and Short Term Borrowing considers interbank deposits with maturity up to one
year, time deposits with maturity up to one year, wholesale funding with maturity up to one year,
and 80% of saving and current accounts.
The LAR index needs to be higher than 20% for the bank to be considered liquid. We have
confirmed with the bank that the ratio was above the minimum threshold during the period for
which we perform our coordination risk analysis. At that time, time deposits accounted for more
than 15% of the bank’s total liquidity.
The bank also monitored another liquidity index, the Maturity Mismatch Ratio (MMR), given
by:
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Maturity Mismatch Ratio =
Assets− Liabilities of up to 30 days maturity
Short term borrowing
(B2)
This index needs to be higher than -20%. It was the case that during our coordination risk period
the index was significantly above this threshold.
Both indexes deteriorated soon after the January elections, and this trend intensified in early
2015.
C.2.2 Funding Costs
Despite the deposit outflow after the surprise announcement, the bank did not face any funding
problems. The bank was able to borrow from the ECB at similar rates in the weeks following the
announcement (but before the election). Moreover, there were no changes on the interest rates on
both time and demand deposits during this period. Finally, there was a slight decline on the value
of the bank’s collateral during this period. However, this fall did not pose a threat to the banks
solvency.
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